BEFORE THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS

In the Matter of the Application)	
of Snake River Oil and Gas, LLC,)	Docket No.
to Integrate the Spacing Unit)	CC-2021-OGR-01-001
Consisting of the SE 1/4 of)	
Section 10, the SW $1/4$ of)	
Section 11, NW 1/4 of Section 14,	,)	
and the NE $1/4$ of Section 15,)	
Township 8 North, Range 5 West,)	
Boise Meridian, Payette County,)	
Idaho.)	
Snake River Oil and Gas, LLC,)	
Applicant.)	

HEARING TO DETERMINE "JUST AND REASONABLE" FACTORS

DATE/TIME: MAY 20, 2021, at 1:00 p.m.

LOCATION: Fruitland City Hall, 200 S. Whitney Dr., Fruitland, ID.

TRANSCRIBED BY:

EMILY L. NORD, CSR No. 695, RPR

Notary Public

Hearing May 20, 2021

	Gas to integrate the Spacing Unit		Wiay 20, 2021
	Page 2		Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:	1	P R O C E E D I N G S
2	Idaho Oil and Gas Conservation Commission:	2	
4	Mick Thomas (Administrator/Hearing Officer)	3	0
5	mthomas@idl.idaho.gov	4	<u> </u>
6	Chris Gozzo	5	8 8 8 1 I
7			I want to make sure I check all the boxes and try to eliminate the ums and uhs as much as possible; although,
8	For Snake River Oil & Gas, LLC:		if you've been in hearings with me before, they're going
9	MICHAEL R. CHRISTIAN		to happen. So just hang in there with me.
10	Smith & Malek	10	
11	101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 930	11	2021-OGR-01-001. It's now 1:03 p.m., Thursday, May
12	Boise, ID 83702		20th, 2021. We're at the Fruitland City Hall in
13	mike@smithmalek.com	13	Fruitland, Idaho.
14		14	This is the time set to determine the factors
15	For the Idaho Department of Lands:		I will consider when determining whether the terms and
16	JOY VEGA		conditions of an integration order are "just and
17	Deputy Attorney General		reasonable," as provided in Idaho Code 47-320(1), for
18	P.O. Box 83720		the spacing unit consisting of the SE $1/4$ of Section 10,
19	Boise, ID 83720-0010		the SW 1/4 of Section 11, the NW 1/4 of Section 14, and
20	joy.vega@ag.idaho.gov		the NE 1/4 of Section 15, Township 8 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Payette County, Idaho.
21		22	
22 23			and minerals and nav waters Division Administrator,
23 24	(Appearances continued)		presiding over and conducting the hearing today,
25	(Appearances continued)		pursuant to Idaho Code 47-328.
	Page 3		Page 5
1			
1	APPEARANCES (Cont.):	1	I want to let everyone know that, depending on
2		2	how long this goes, we may have some spontaneous
2 3	For Non-Consenting Owners and CAIA:	2 3	how long this goes, we may have some spontaneous recesses that I'll call for five or ten minutes to let
2 3 4	For Non-Consenting Owners and CAIA: JAMES M. PIOTROWSKI	2 3 4	how long this goes, we may have some spontaneous recesses that I'll call for five or ten minutes to let everybody do what they need to do. Hopefully we can get
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and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit		May 20, 2021
	Page 6		Page 8
1	"watch hearing" on Facebook Live link.	1	That said, will Snake River's representative
2	The documents in this record, Docket No.		please identify themselves for the record.
	CC-2021-OGR-01-001 are on the OGCC website at	3	
	OGCC.Idaho.gov/administrative hearings.	_	here, I want to make sure that everything is operating.
5	As my April 6th, 2021, notice indicates, this	5	
	hearing is addressing scope of factors used to determine		now.
	"just and reasonable." I am not addressing today what	7	
	terms are in fact "just and reasonable." That is a	8	
	question for a future evidentiary hearing held at a	9	MR. GOZZO: If somebody else is joined to the
	later date.	10	
11	I have allowed briefing and submittal of	11	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I think we've got it
	affidavits on the issue of the scope of factors used to		resolved.
	determine "just and reasonable," and I plan to take	13	
	argument at that pardon me take only argument at	14	
	this hearing.	15	
16	Before I go any further, I want to address a	16	
	request I received from the Dorsings to be admitted as a	17	
	party. My understanding, based on the application and	18	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. Please go
	their request, is that the Dorsings are uncommitted	19	
	mineral interest owners in the spacing unit in this	20	MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you, Mister
	matter. Given that, and that they have responded, they	21	
	are already a part of the proceeding, to this	22	
	proceeding. You may participate in this hearing. Just	23	
	keep in mind the focus is to determine the scope of	24	
	factors I'll use to determine whether terms are "just	25	spend some time on some things that you probably
	5		
	Page 7		Page 9
1		1	
	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain		you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus
2	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable."	2	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going
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2 3 4	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable." Also, I want to again clarify that the deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this	2 3 4	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or
2 3 4 5	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable." Also, I want to again clarify that the deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this application has not passed, and they can still	2 3 4	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or the Department.
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2 3 4 5 6 7	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable." Also, I want to again clarify that the deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this application has not passed, and they can still participate in future evidentiary hearings on the integration application. Witnesses and evidence may be	2 3 4 5 6 7	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or the Department. And if I'm redundant, I apologize. If you think you've heard enough on the subject and you want me
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable." Also, I want to again clarify that the deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this application has not passed, and they can still participate in future evidentiary hearings on the integration application. Witnesses and evidence may be submitted at that evidentiary hearing. We'll proceed with this hearing as follows: I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or the Department. And if I'm redundant, I apologize. If you think you've heard enough on the subject and you want me to move on, please tell me, because I don't want to take
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable." Also, I want to again clarify that the deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this application has not passed, and they can still participate in future evidentiary hearings on the integration application. Witnesses and evidence may be submitted at that evidentiary hearing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or the Department. And if I'm redundant, I apologize. If you think you've heard enough on the subject and you want me to move on, please tell me, because I don't want to take up any more of your time than is necessary.
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unu	Gas to integrate the spacing Unit		Way 20, 2021
	Page 10		Page 12
1	order in CAIA versus Schultz. In fact, he stated, in	1	amount of process has already been extended to the
	his Memorandum Decision, that "holding a new hearing		participants in getting to this point.
	will impose relatively few financial or administrative	3	
	costs on the Defendants. The hearing will involve the	_	go after this, I again respectfully suggest that the
	same issues, parties, and facts that the previous one		Administrator and the Department must keep in mind the
	did. The only change required will be the specification		stated purpose of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and
	of the basis on which Defendants determine factors to be		
			the scope of their and the Commission's authority. The Commission is not an all-encompassing
	relevant or irrelevant to the determination of "just and reasonable" terms.	8	1 0
9			regulator of all subjects. It does not police their
10	Before this, in his Memorandum Decision, he		party contracts. It does not make economic decisions
	had described the case as a close one. In other words,		for operators. Its primary purpose is to encourage
	that the amount of additional process that was due		production while ensuring different interest holders are
	should not be extensive. And he had said that "the		able to receive their equitable share of production
	Commission has a significant amount of discretion to		while preventing waste.
	decide what 'just and reasonable' means."	15	While it does have a role to play in ensuring
16	He stated that his order did "not affect the		safe drilling and production operations and protection
	hearing officers' ability to exclude irrelevant or		of surface elements, that role is largely accomplished
	unnecessary testimony or evidence, or the Commission's		through existing requirements in the Act of the
	discretion to determine what facts should be considered		Commission's rules.
	when determining whether terms and conditions of an	20	This will not be the first time that you've
	integration order are 'just and reasonable.'"		heard me repeat this, but the Act states that it is a
22	In other words, what he appears to have		public policy of the State "to foster, encourage, and
	intended was simply that an integration hearing would be		promote the development, production and utilization of
	re-held, but that prior to it, the Commission or the		the natural resources of oil and gas in the State of
25	Department would describe factors that would be	25	Idaho in such a manner as will prevent waste, to provide
	Page 11		Page 13
1	considered in determining "just and reasonable" terms of		for uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the
1 2	considered in determining "just and reasonable" terms of integration as an exercise of its discretion.	2	for uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the production of oil and gas throughout the State of Idaho,
2 3	considered in determining "just and reasonable" terms of integration as an exercise of its discretion. So far, I think that is not what has happened.	2 3	for uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the production of oil and gas throughout the State of Idaho, to authorize and to provide for the operations and
2 3 4	considered in determining "just and reasonable" terms of integration as an exercise of its discretion. So far, I think that is not what has happened. After multiple rounds of briefing and argument to the	2 3 4	for uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the production of oil and gas throughout the State of Idaho, to authorize and to provide for the operations and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I've cited the Idaho Power vs. IPUC case in briefing. And the Department, of course, is the administrative arm of the Commission. The Commission, as you know, is given jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property, public and private, necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act, and it has power and authority to make and enforce rules, regulations and orders, and do whatever may be reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. Similarly, the Act provides that the Commission is authorized, and it is its duty, to regulate the exploration for and production of oil and gas, prevent waste of oil and gas, and to protect correlative rights and otherwise administer and enforce the Act. The Act directs that in the event of conflict, prevention of waste is paramount. All of this is most of it's in 47-314 and 315. Although a thorough reading of Section 315 of the Act makes it clear that the focus makes clear the focus of the Commission's [unintelligible], to encourage production, protect correlative rights, and prevent waste. There is reference to surface owners in 315	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	requirements of the Act and the rules as I've summarized, is it just and reasonable to require the operator's other requirements with respect to uncommitted mineral owners, which go much further. The opposing mineral owners, in their briefing, suggested the term "just and reasonable" must apply to every other element of Section 320 of the Act relating to integration, apparently so as to prevent anyone opposing integration to engage in an investigation and challenge of every other element i.e., location, drilling, equipping and operation of the well as part of the integration process. The statute, Section 320, of course does not say this, nor is it necessarily implied. As previous orders have done, and virtually every integration and pooling order in every other producing state does, as near as I can tell, the order may simply, as the statute says, authorize the drilling and operation of the well and designate the operator. The details of drilling and operations are dealt within the permit to drill, issued pursuant to Section 316 of the Act, and under the drilling and casing, testing, treating, completion, metering, reporting, plugging, and other rules set forth in IDAPA 20.07.02. To impose requirements differing from those
25	There is reference to surface owners in 315, Page 15	25	To impose requirements differing from those Page 17
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	sub 2, but it's only as a modifier to protecting correlative rights by administering the provisions of the chapter, and it goes on. So how does the Commission do this? How does this happen? First, the Act covers several subjects. Well spacing and drilling location requirements were set out in Sections 317 and 318 of the Act. Requirements for setbacks are laid out in Section 319. Royalty payment and recording requirements are provided in Sections 331 and 332. Surface owner protections are provided in Section 334. And, Second, the Commission's [inaudible] promulgated rules covering drilling, well construction, well treatments, production, reclamation, and other operational requirements in IDAPA 20.07.02. It is useful, I think, in reaching "just and reasonable" terms, to evaluate whether a proposed term or condition exceeds these requirements. In other words, if an operator proposes terms that are otherwise economically reasonable in comparison to those involuntary leases in the area, where joint operating agreements in use, or in other mature producing states, or as between the operator and its working interest partners, and the operator is subject to the operational	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	rules would render them effectively [unintelligible]; and to impose different conditions in different units, far from bringing uniformity of regulation as the Act calls for, would cause us to end up with the exact opposite, a hodgepodge of requirements varying by unit. This is obviously not what the Act contemplates or intends. Moreover, these are specific outcomes. They are not factors to be considered. And as such, I think they're beyond the scope of the hearing. In any case, there is already, in multiple ways, ways mineral owners can participate more deeply in operations. First, as provided in the Act, under an integration order they can elect to participate in a well, sign the joint operating agreement, in which case they can be on equal footing with other working interest partners who invest in and take on the risk of the well. This is a difference between a participating interest and a royalty interest. Second, they also have existing avenues for relief if they think an operator is violating the Act and the rules. They can file a complaint with the Commission, for example, under Section 328. One indication of what the integration statute is intended to address is the limitation of persons who

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	may participate in the integration process, uncommitted mineral interest owners, per Section 328(3)(b), which led to my objection and briefing to CAIA's participation, because it's not an uncommitted mineral interest owner. That means, contrary to the opposing mineral interest owner's suggestion, that those who do not own an uncommitted mineral interest in the unit are not subject to participation as parties; not mobile home park residents in the unit, not other people who do not own mineral rights in the unit. The suggestion, near the end of the opposing mineral owners' opening brief, that "just and reasonable" terms should be based on the input of all property owners, not just mineral owners and I think that's a quote with notice and expansion of the proceedings, is contrary to Section 328(3)(b). And again, this is a specific outcome, not a factor. I don't think this is even the venue to argue about whether the factual assertions that the opposing mineral owners make in support of that position are true. Those are issues, I think, for the legislature, if anyone. The procedural due process arguments the opposing mineral owners make, essentially that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	expressed, through leasing, their desire to develop their minerals and receive the benefit of it. The integration statute exists also to protect the interest of the majority from the tyranny of the minority. And I don't think you can lose sight of that. In their reply brief, the opposing mineral owners cite a rate case from the Supreme Court, the Federal Power Commission vs. Natural Gas Pipeline. It's a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, and they cited the proposition that forced integration statutes could survive could only survive [unintelligible] constitutional review, excuse me, in addition to addressing mineral recovery and correlative rights. They also include a requirement that the terms of forced integration be just and reasonable. The decision they cite to involves rates chargeable by a regulated utility interstate commerce, not integration or pooling of mineral interests. The issue in the case was whether the rate allowed by the Federal Power Commission was so low as to be [unintelligible] and violated the charging utilities' constitutional rights. Essentially the Court found that no property interest was taken by the rate granted by the
	entire process should be made even longer, should		Commission, and no consideration of due process as a
	Page 19		Page 21
2	involve subpoena power to the mineral owners, and should involve the Department engaging experts to investigate		condition to a taking was [unintelligible] reached. It
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	market conditions, quote, "viability of collection, processing and transmission facilities," are, again, directly contrary to the Act and, again, are specific outcomes, not factors. But they also completely ignore Judge Winmill's decision in CAIA vs. Schultz, wherein he said, again, it was a close case and that the only change necessary to meet due process requirements was to tell uncommitted mineral interest owners ahead of time what factors would be considered. This is an exercise of discretion by the Commission and the Department, and the opposing mineral owners would take virtually all of that discretion away. As an aside, the characterization of the opposing mineral owners at the beginning of their reply brief, that Snake River is offering "awful, miserly, or merely irrelevant compensation terms and trying to avoid all accountability for harm," are beyond not being	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	has nothing to do with the issues here and does not stand for the proposition that the opposing mineral owners have cited it for. Likewise, the citations to rate-setting cases in the opposing mineral owners' outgoing brief are not relevant here. The Act has specific provisions, and Judge Winmill's decision was quite limited in its scope. I'm not going to repeat for you the factors that we propose on behalf of Snake River, other than to comment that we submit that the factors can be fitted within the scope and purpose of the Act; and, second, that they are still, I think, well beyond what is implied in other producing states with similar statutory schemes. In my reply briefing I think I directed you to a couple of examples of pooling [unintelligible] from Arkansas and Wyoming. Both have pooling or integration statutes which are or if not identical, pretty analogous to Idaho's. In neither case does the order go anywhere

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1	proceeding, that form of order is used. I printed it	1	something of the leases are at a hundred-dollars-or-less
	off. I think I have a copy of it. But and with		bonus, and an eighth royalty. There may be leases that
	blanks for the numbers, basically, for what the royalty		have a slightly higher royalty, and they I'm sure all
	should be, what the risk penalty should be, what the		of them are in an instance where someone owned a large
			•
	bonus should be. But effectively, that's the form		acreage area where they basically had buying power,
	that's used. And it's consistent with the form of order		where it was advantageous to the operator to tie up a
7	for Arkansas as well.	7	larger a much larger piece of acreage.
8	I think everything else that I have to say is	8	
	set forth well enough in our briefing. I don't want to	9	eighth is the norm.
10	take up any more time. And I'll take any questions you	10	Likewise, the form of joint operating
11	may have.	11	agreement that has been used between I think each of the
12	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr.	12	prior operators I'm not sure about Bridge, but I know
13	Christian. Hold on just a moment. I want to shut this	13	Alta Mesa and Snake River have used effectively the same
	door because I'm hearing some rattling back here.		form of joint operating agreement between themselves and
15	(Brief pause in proceedings.)		their working interest partners across all of the
16	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I've got just a few		operations in this area.
	more general questions for the audience that I was going	17	
	to address before I invited you up.		Association of Professional Landmen form, a standard
19	Are the Dorsings in attendance today? Are		form, which is used across the country. So the form
	they here via Zoom? I just want to make sure.		that Snake River has proposed in this application, for
20	(Pause given for response.)		example, is effectively the same form that they've used
			with their own working interest partners.
22	(No response.)		
23	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Well, whether they	23	
	speak up now or not, I just want to make sure they knew		think you can derive information, either from what's
25	they were invited.	25	broadly in use in the industry locally or nationally,
	Page 23		Page 25
1	Thank you, Mr. Christian. I have a few	1	and what's the norm as between the operator and its
	questions You answered the first one I believe		
2	questions. You answered the first one, I believe,	2	royalty interest owners/lessors.
2 3	pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put	2 3	royalty interest owners/lessors. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. A few
2 3 4	pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put it to you because I wanted to ask the other parties the	2 3 4	royalty interest owners/lessors. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. A few more questions. Should the factors used to determine
2 3 4 5	pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put it to you because I wanted to ask the other parties the same question as well.	2 3 4 5	royalty interest owners/lessors. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. A few more questions. Should the factors used to determine "just and reasonable" terms consider the use of
2 3 4 5 6	pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put it to you because I wanted to ask the other parties the same question as well. Thank you for the information you provide in	2 3 4 5 6	royalty interest owners/lessors. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. A few more questions. Should the factors used to determine "just and reasonable" terms consider the use of uncommitted owners' lands, including whether a wellbore
2 3 4 5 6 7	pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put it to you because I wanted to ask the other parties the same question as well. Thank you for the information you provide in your brief regarding industry standards when regarding	2 3 4 5 6 7	royalty interest owners/lessors. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. A few more questions. Should the factors used to determine "just and reasonable" terms consider the use of uncommitted owners' lands, including whether a wellbore or pipeline may physically cross the land of an
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-	surface. So it is somewhat fact dependent	-	torms proposed how should I reconcile that request with
1 2	surface. So it is somewhat fact-dependent. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. Your		terms proposed, how should I reconcile that request with the argument you just made, that scope of factors should
	brief says that the IDL proposes terms that go beyond		be limited to economic terms, at least predominantly
	the Act's purpose and would impose terms and conditions		economic terms?
	regarding subjects over which the OGCC lacks authority.	- 5	MR. CHRISTIAN: I think you have to you
	If that is the case, would the scope of "just and	_	would compare what's proposed with mostly, with
	reasonable" terms, and ultimately an integration order,		what's already out there in the market. What have a
	be limited to economic terms and therefore not address		thousand voluntary lessors agreed to? And what have the
	unrelated proposed terms?		you know, what's in place in the I don't know how
10	MR. CHRISTIAN: I think the vast majority of		many producing units we have right now. Maybe six. But
	the consideration is economic terms, and that's what's		there have been more you know, what's in place in
	reflected in integration or statutory pooling orders		those areas that were successfully produced or continue
	from other states. They are concerned with, again,		to be successfully produced? Those would be two obvious
	correlative rights and prevention of waste, which is to		places to look.
	say, making sure that those uncommitted mineral interest	15	So I guess what I'm saying is, it's you
	owners get their fair share, that they have their		
	opportunity to receive their equitable share of		term? There are you know, basically how long the
	production.		lease is going to be for. Is there an option, and how
19	I think, you know, following up on the last		long should it be?
20	question you just asked, there are some operational	20	That could also be dependent upon whether
21	considerations you could take into account, a 12-inch	21	either whether there's a well already in the unit or
	line across somebody's front yard on the surface. Well,		whether there's already a drilling permit proposed, for
	I mean, to the extent it's not already answered by		example. It would be reasonable for you to ask, I
	either the statute the Act or the rules, my argument		think, well, if there's a well in the unit, you know,
25	and comment to you earlier was, the vast majority of	25	what should the primary term be?
	Page 27		Page 29
1	that subject matter is already covered by the Act and	1	Because, you know, assuming that the order
	the rules. The operator has to follow the Act and the		gets entered and there's some provision for extension
	rules in how it conducts itself.		for example, if it gets appealed or it's litigated or
4	And there are and I think I set it out in		whatever. You know, once it gets to the point where it
	some more detail in my briefing there are notice and		is a final order, it's not unreasonable to say you, the
	opportunity for hearing requirements and opportunities		operator, should turn the well on soon. But, you know,
	for surface owners or uncommitted mineral interest		those are factors you could take into consideration.
	owners to participate over a number of different	8	But mostly I think it is a comparison to
	subjects.	9	
10	For example, I've got you know, if an	10	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr.
	operator wants to engage in well treatment, they have to		Christian. Those are all the questions I have for you
	give notice to, you know, a certain surrounding area.		right now.
	And those people have an opportunity, if they want to	13	MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you.
	have a hearing, to talk about it, or at least comment on	14	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Next I'm going to
	it. When well permit applications are filed, they're	15	call on Mr. Piotrowski. Let's make sure he's Mr.
16	posted on the Department's website, and those folks have	16	Piotrowski, can you speak and make sure we all hear you
17	an opportunity to comment on them. And then the	17	and everything?
18	Department can take that into consideration.	18	MR. PIOTROWSKI: I I certainly can speak.
19	So I think that there's a that the sphere	19	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. We're hearing
	of consideration into operational issues in an		you. Very good. Before you begin, I have a question.
	integration order is pretty limited. I don't think it's		Could you please state who you represent and,
	zero, but I think it's pretty limited because of statute		specifically, parties within its unit?
	rules.	23	MR. PIOTROWSKI: Yes, I certainly can. I'm
24	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay, thank you. One	24	James Piotrowski. I'm here on behalf of Kevin and
25	follow-up question: If there are noneconomic lease	25	Margery Plevenger, Kristina & Lynn Larsen, as well as

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2	Citizens Alliance for Integrity and Accountability in its representational role, representing its members in the unit, which includes the Plevengers and the Larsens.	2	despite a strong interest in constitutional history, nobody has, over the last now 80 years, gone back to the
4	Mr. Thomas, you have a difficult job here.	4	courts to say, well, what does "just and reasonable" mean in this particular context. A different kind of
5	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Stand by. I		question. And it's a question we raise, and it's a
6	apologize for that. I want to make sure that people in		question we will continue to raise; "we" meaning my
	the audience can hear. I just had someone jump up. So hold your momentum. We'll get you right back.		clients, the minerals owner in this case; my clients, the mineral owners in the other cases currently pending;
9	MR. PIOTROWSKI: Will do.		and, in general, the people of Idaho.
10	(Brief pause in proceedings.)	10	So you have to reach this decision,
11	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Now, that's about as		Mr. Thomas, and you have very little to guide you.
	loud as he's going to go. If you'd like to walk up and	12	Now, I will do my best to provide you what I
	hear better, you can.		think is reasonable guidance and have done so. The process we're using to do this is also somewhat a
14 15	Okay, Mr. Piotrowski, go ahead. MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you.		challenge. Snake River's lawyer is unhappy at the
16	Mr. Thomas, you have been given a rather		process that was chosen, but that process has been
	difficult job, and through no fault of your own;		chosen by the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. It
	although, through some fault of the oil and gas		was their decision to use the case-by-case approach.
	industry, frankly. You are asked to address, in this		That was not the approach that they were forced into.
	particular step of the proceeding, the factors that will		It was not it was an approach that was certainly
	be considered in determining "just and reasonable." You		considered by multiple parties. But it is the choice
	are doing so against a background that gives you very	22	made by the Commission.
23	little information.	23	We are here today on this particular
24	And that is not your fault. That is the fault		integration application, not through any fault of
25	of the fact that the American justice system has finally	25	[unintelligible], not through any fault of the
	Page 31		Page 33
	come to realize the enormous challenges posed to		landowners; but by the fact that Snake River Oil and Gas
	existing property law and constitutional law by the oil		chose to file this application at the time it chose.
	and gas industry, which and is doing so in the		And so if there has been delay, if there have been
	case of you and I, Mr. Thomas, doing so in a location where we are not well-versed in these things.		difficulties, they are not the result of anybody else's conduct. They are the result of the conduct of Alta
5	Mr. Christian has given some effort to		Mesa Idaho, now bankrupt, and Snake River Oil and Gas,
7	presenting, to you, integration orders and integration		the current holder of the operational rights.
	proceedings from other locations. Normally that would	8	So we're here, and the process of getting here
	be useful and helpful to you. However, again, we're	9	was not the process chosen by any of the parties before
	doing so in an environment where you face the unique		you except for Snake River Oil and Gas. So you're stuck
11	challenge that, for whatever reason, over the last		with trying to figure out what factors should be
	1 1 1 1 6 4 1 1	1.0	included. And we think that, and we have presented our
1 2	hundred-plus years, very few property owners have chosen		
	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners	13	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call
14	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the	13 14	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are
14 15	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the State take our property and force us to sell it to	13 14 15	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors,
14 15 16	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the State take our property and force us to sell it to somebody else.	13 14 15 16	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors, which includes both procedural and substantive due
14 15 16 17	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the State take our property and force us to sell it to somebody else. And so you're stuck with the situation in	13 14 15 16 17	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors, which includes both procedural and substantive due process factors; and what I think we can go ahead and
14 15 16 17 18	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the State take our property and force us to sell it to somebody else. And so you're stuck with the situation in which the only guidance you have, in addressing some of	13 14 15 16 17 18	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors, which includes both procedural and substantive due process factors; and what I think we can go ahead and agree to call a separate category of procedural factors.
14 15 16 17 18 19	almost no property owners or mineral rights owners have chosen to ask the question, can you and you, the State take our property and force us to sell it to somebody else. And so you're stuck with the situation in which the only guidance you have, in addressing some of this, is the very clear guidance from the United States	13 14 15 16 17 18 19	briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors, which includes both procedural and substantive due process factors; and what I think we can go ahead and agree to call a separate category of procedural factors. I don't necessarily view them that way, but
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and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit		May 20, 2021
	Page 34		Page 36
1	job of deciding what does "just and reasonable" mean in	1	literally every other factor that might go into these
	the constitutional setting as applied to this process.		terms is something that should be evaluated to determine
3	So let's start with a short discussion of the		its effect on whether the overall proposal is just and
	statutory purpose. Now, there is an express stated		reasonable.
	legislative purpose. That is the statement that	5	Now, the legislature was not and cannot be
	Mr. Christian and Snake River Oil and Gas routinely	6	assumed to have been expert in what are the terms that
	bring out; although they, for fairly obvious reasons,		make up an oil and gas lease. And so that's why these
8	focus on only the first statement of purpose, that		factors are implied. They left that to you. And those
9	statement being the one that it is the public policy of	9	are the factors, both the statutory purpose factors and
10	the State to encourage production. But, in fact, the	10	the implied statutory factors, that are set out in our
11	statutory purposes go far beyond that and are express.	11	brief, and I don't wish to repeat them here.
12	The first purposes are relatively obvious.	12	There are also the what I'm going to call
	Clearly, if the legislature had anything in mind about		the constitutional factors. Now, it's important, in
	what constitutes just and reasonable, it would be the		addressing these, to understand a couple of points that
	things they actually wrote about in their own		are not [unintelligible]. First of all, the uncommitted
	legislation. So that's relatively clear.		owners are not asking you, Mr. Thomas, to decide that
17	But there are also unstated but reasonably		any part of the statute is unconstitutional. That is
	assumed I'm not even talking about implied, but just		beyond your authority, in all likelihood there's
	reasonable assumed statutory factors. The discretion of		certainly an administrative law argument to that point
20	6		to be made, and we are not asking you to make that
	expressly but by implication, as recognized by the		determination.
	Federal District Court, to the Commission and the Administrator.	22	In fact, we are making exactly the opposite argument, which is to say that the statute is
23 24	And a clearly required statutory purpose was		constitutional as long as the terms set in the
	the assumption that you and the Commission would		integration order are just and reasonable. And it is
23	the assumption that you and the commission would	23	integration order are just and reasonable. This it is
	Page 35		Page 37
1		1	
	exercise that discretion in compliance with the law.		not constitutional if those terms are not just and
2	exercise that discretion in compliance with the law. The assumption was certainly not that you would step out		not constitutional if those terms are not just and reasonable.
2 3	exercise that discretion in compliance with the law.	2 3	not constitutional if those terms are not just and
2 3 4	exercise that discretion in compliance with the law. The assumption was certainly not that you would step out and try to violate the law. And had that been the	2 3 4	not constitutional if those terms are not just and reasonable. So we are not asking you to find that the
2 3 4 5 6	exercise that discretion in compliance with the law. The assumption was certainly not that you would step out and try to violate the law. And had that been the assumption, I doubt you would have taken the job. The assumption is, you will do your best to perform your task while complying with all existing law, and that's	2 3 4 5	not constitutional if those terms are not just and reasonable. So we are not asking you to find that the statute is invalid in any way. And so any search into that effect is just simply incorrect. In fact, we're asking you to make sure that the statute is valid.
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and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit		May 20, 2021
	Page 38		Page 40
-	So satisfying the explicit requirement of the		chligated to do at some point, you will be talling
1	So satisfying the explicit requirement of the		obligated to do at some point, you will be telling somebody we are selling we, the State of Idaho, are
	judgment in CAIA vs. Schultz; that is to say, and as		
	Mr. Christian did say, simply telling us what the		selling your property to somebody else. That's the
	factors are. While that is adequate to satisfy the		nature of integration.
	requirement in CAIA vs. Schultz, it would be extremely	5	0
	shortsighted to assume that that also means everything		address. I'm not necessarily going to take those in
	else under the broad rubric of due process of law is		order.
8	also satisfied.	8	In determining, first, the issue of
9	This is further demonstrated by the fact that		correlative rights. Mr. Thomas, not surprisingly as
	despite Mr. Christian pointing out the nature of		a representative of the oil and gas industry that
	integration orders from several other states, he is		doesn't own, doesn't have any holding of any of these
	unable to cite a single case from a federal court,		mineral rights necessarily, folks, is on the rights
	sitting as a constitutional reviewer, that has said, oh,		of individuals that produce their gas. But the
	yeah, these factors are acceptable and are adequate to		ownership of the thing includes both the right to sell
	satisfy due process. That's not his fault. He can't do		it and the right to keep it.
	that because, as far as I can tell, such a case does not	16	
	exist. The question has not been answered.		is going to include balancing of the rights of those who
18	So, Mr. Thomas, again, coming back to where I		want to produce against those who think it's not the right time, those who think it's not a very good deal,
	started, you have the task of deciding, in the first		
	instance, what does the constitution require to make something just and reasonable so that the statute is		those who think it harms their property more than it helps it.
	valid. This isn't addressed in prior integration orders	21	
	for Idaho. It isn't addressed in integration orders		sell is an important first step in understanding, what
	from other states. It isn't addressed in prior		are you going to order be done when that right is denied
	constitutional challenges to integration orders, either		[unintelligible].
25	constitutional enancinges to integration orders, entited	25	[unintenigible].
	Page 39		Page 41
	Page 39		Page 41
	from Idaho or elsewhere, because they simply don't	1	[Unintelligible] we should talk about the
2	from Idaho or elsewhere, because they simply don't exist.	2	[Unintelligible] we should talk about the procedural methods here. The oil and gas companies want
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and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit	May 20, 2021
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	statements. And that's what this procedure that we're proposing is about, and, yes, it looks an awful lot like a court proceeding. But that's the tool that American jurisprudence has chosen, to test the truth of facts. So things like giving us adequate time to prepare, providing us subpoena power, providing us the ability to actively and, when necessary, aggressively cross-examine those who are making statements under oath to you, are all tools for finding the truth. And that is also very closely related to the final category, which is to recognize the substantive rights of mineral holders. In addition to their right to decline, if they are forced to sell despite their right to decline, then the rate-setting cases which is very much what you're doing here, Mr. Thomas. You're setting a rate. It's just not it's not the royalty rate or the bonus rate, but it's everything else that goes into what are the terms of sale. The law in this teaches us that there are a lot of factors involved, that a lot of those factors are really economic. It is hard to imagine a better example where the economic and the noneconomic are actually identical. If you're going to force somebody to sell what is under their property, then the harm you do to	 one, if not if not an easy one, which is to say, we are about to engage in the process of telling people that we are going to take something they paid for, against their will, on terms they don't approve of, and we're going to sell it to someone else. This is an exercise of State power over people's homes. Let's not pretend otherwise. And that implicates fundamental rights at an incredible level. So to that end, the factors we have identified, and the factors that the Department of Lands has identified, are both highly relevant to determine what is just and reasonable. And, finally, if you find yourself uncertain of which way to go, sir, which I wouldn't blame you for, we can go back to I mean, literally and directly, to the statute itself. What is just. What is reasonable. It is not just for a corporate oil and gas operator to come and say, we're going to shift the costs of our operation on to people who didn't want anything to do with it in the first place. It is not just to come to people and to say,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Page 43 the surface estate is an economic harm. If, in the course of forcing someone to sell their subsurface estate, or a portion of their subsurface estate, you destroy the value of their surface estate, that's an economic harm. If you force somebody to sell their mineral rights at a below-market rate, then you are not only violating due process, you are doing economic harm. The fact that something is economic does not mean it is unimportant. It does not mean it doesn't have constitutional significance. In fact, it means quite the opposite. Where economic harm is done, the law of due process is always held. It is much easier to prove that there is a deprivation of an interest that requires due process of law. So the argument that this is purely economic and therefore somehow excluded from constitutional consideration wouldn't be more wrong. The combination of the correlative rights of nonconsenting owners, the procedural tools that are used to find the truth and to protect the interests of everybody involved in a transaction, and the substantive	 Page 45 we're going to let these people we're going to let these outsiders, these people who you don't owe anything to, come to your land, drill under your property, and if they happen to poison your groundwater, well, we're not going to do anything about that. "Just and reasonable" implies fairness. It implies a good deal. It implies that nobody is shifting their costs on to anybody else. And it implies that everybody who didn't want to participate in this deal that's being forced on them, be able to walk away in no worse position than they are right now. When this is all said and done, everybody should be in a better position than they were before it started. And right now, with the terms proposed by Snake River Oil and Gas, we don't think that's the case and that's what we think the upcoming hearing should address, how to make sure that that happens. As Mr. Christian admitted whether or not, for instance, surface use of the subject estates is appropriate and within "just and reasonable" is highly contextual. It will depend on the facts on the ground.
22 23	due process rights related to ensuring that the overall terms of sale are fair and reasonable, are all related. And so you can't have one without the other. To that end, our position is a fairly simple	 And so that is why you face this task of trying to decide, in each case, one at a time, what is just and reasonable. Here, where the spacing unit includes both

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 industrial and agriculture and residential, and I don't honestly remember whether this particular spacing unit includes municipal property, but where all of those things are in existence, then the factors to be considered should reflect all of those things. If this were purely a spacing unit that consisted of nothing but 640 acres of rangeland, it would be a different case. That is not the case we have. And the factors you choose should reflect the interests of everybody who will be affected, including the homeowners that are my clients here. I would be happy to answer any questions. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Piotrowski. I've just got a few questions for you, and then I am going to have a courtesy 15-minute break for people in the room and whatnot, and then we'll come back. But let's address let's go to a couple of questions first. First, with the people you represent, are they members of CAIA? MR. PIOTROWSKI: Yes, they are. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. And I'll pose this question to you; it's the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	in Idaho at this point. We have a company that came in and has tried to establish industry standards that are suitable to it and its profit margin. That does not make them actual industry standards. We won't have industry standards in Idaho until we have a lot more experience with what it's like to drill and produce here in Idaho. And so while generalized industry standards are helpful, they provide some level of guidance. But, one, I don't know how you'll find those standards, to be honest, you know, because they are difficult to suss out. And, two, they may still not be appropriate for our setting. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Mr. Christian, thank you for that. And with that, it's 2:05 Mountain Time. Chris, I'm going to ask you to pause the recording for about 15 minutes so everyone can get some air and maybe a drink, and we'll resume at 2:20 Mountain Time. All right? (Recess held.) MR. GOZZO: The recording has been started. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you very much.			
	single question I'm going to pose to everyone: Could	24				
25	you share what industry standards are regarding factors	25	saw, I tried to improve the speakers for some of those			
	Page 47		Page 49			
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12	used in setting "just and reasonable" terms. MR. PIOTROWSKI: The industry standards, to my research, vary from place to place and are developing over time. The form contract that Mr. Christian continually points to, and that is included as part of their application and is apparently the basis of the voluntary leases they've entered into, is very broadly written and is written in such a way that it can address many different types of operations. And so, for instance, the industry standards in North Dakota will be different from industry standards in western Pennsylvania, and those will be different from industry standards in west Texas. And	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Mr. Piotrowski. Right now I would like to call on the Idaho Department of Lands' counsel. For the record, please state your name and who you represent. MS. VEGA: Thank you, Mr. Thomas. My name is Joy Vega. I'm a deputy attorney general with the Idaho Office of the Attorney General, appearing today on behalf of the Department of Lands' Oil and Gas Division. The Idaho Department of Lands did file an			
15 16 17 18	those standards are highly contextual. Here in Idaho, those alleged thousands of leases that Mr. Christian speaks of, the vast majority of those were entered into by one company, Alta Mesa and its affiliates. And so it doesn't tell us much about industry standards here in southwest Idaho.	15 16 17 18	opening brief in this matter. The stated intent of IDL's brief is to provide easy reference points to applicable Idaho Code sections, administrative rules, and other contract-based considerations that may be necessary or relevant in establishing what "just and reasonable" factors excuse me, what "just and			

and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit		May 20, 202
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1	statutory requirements that enable the integration of	1	integration proceeding because Idaho Code 47-320
	the uncomitted mineral interest owners, pursuant to		provides that the Department, "May prescribe the terms
	Idaho Code Section 47-320 and IDAPA 20.07.02.		and conditions upon which the royalty interests in the
4	Additionally through this process, evidence		unit, or units, shall, in the absence of voluntary
	may be accepted as to what "just and reasonable" factors		agreements, be deemed to be integrated without the
	have been established as a result of this hearing.		necessity of a subsequent separate order integrating the
	IDL's input on the identification of the		royalty interests."
7	-		
	applicable statutory and regulatory provisions matters, because the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has	8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		9	1 5 5
	delegated most of its powers and duties, vested by law,		interests in the unit will be integrated, utilizing the
	to the Department. IDL has authority and obligation to		minimum requirements of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act
	administer or enforce most of the provisions of the Oil		is an appropriate baseline for ensuring that an
	and Gas Conservation Act, whether by expressed		integration order includes terms and conditions that are
	declaration of the legislature, or a delegation by the		just and reasonable.
_	Commission.	15	Of the four statutes listed, the Oil and Gas
16	The statutes, rules, and contract-based	16	
	considerations identified in IDL's opening brief are		included, because Idaho Code 47-332, subsection 4, which
	each factors that it has identified as being necessary	18	
	or relevant in the event a final order is issued	19	leased owners, requires that the gross production,
	integrating the uncommitted mineral interest owners in	20	1 '
	the spacing unit that was established, I believe in		gas royalty check stub.
22	2020, in Docket OGR 01-002.	22	
23	Section A of the Idaho Department of Lands'		would have to maintain all reports and records that any
	opening brief addresses just a couple surface-use		integrated owner, as the lessor, may require in order to
25	factors that may integrate or, excuse me, that may	25	verify gross production, disposition, and market value
	Page 51		Page 53
	Page 51		Page 53
	impact integrated parcels. If a surface use of an		of oil and gas sold from the unit.
2	impact integrated parcels. If a surface use of an integrated parcel is addressed in the integration order,	2	of oil and gas sold from the unit. The first sentence of Idaho Code 47-310,
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2 3 4	impact integrated parcels. If a surface use of an integrated parcel is addressed in the integration order, the terms of the order may substitute or supersede the surface-use provisions in the standard lease form that	2 3 4	of oil and gas sold from the unit. The first sentence of Idaho Code 47-310, subsection 11, defines market value as it applies to 47-332, subsection 4, which I just discussed.
2 3 4 5	impact integrated parcels. If a surface use of an integrated parcel is addressed in the integration order, the terms of the order may substitute or supersede the surface-use provisions in the standard lease form that has been submitted by Snake River Oil and Gas at	2 3 4 5	of oil and gas sold from the unit. The first sentence of Idaho Code 47-310, subsection 11, defines market value as it applies to 47-332, subsection 4, which I just discussed. In addition, the second sentence of the
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1	contract terms at least comply with the statutory	1	lease forms are terms that are used by the federal	
	minimum requirements.		government, or other state governments; are terms that	
	-			
3	In turn, it is incumbent upon the applicants,		are common in the industry, generally accepted in this	
	and this tribunal, to ensure that the imposed leased		industry; and the application across state governments	
	terms do not give the operator more than the right to		and the federal government is a normal, understood thing	
	develop, produce, and sell the oil and gas from the		in the industry which also probably benefits our courts	
7	unit.	7	and other sister jurisdictions.	
8	If the standard lease form, submitted as	8	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Ms. Vega.	
	Exhibit D, does not comply with Idaho law, the	9	That's all I have.	
	integration order is the tool for altering those form	10	MS. VEGA: Thank you.	
11	contract's terms.	11	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Folks, thanks a lot.	
12	Therefore the considerations listed in Section	12	I was going to ask again, are the Dorsings in attendance	
13	C could be useful in enabling this tribunal to ensure	13	either virtually or in person?	
14	that a final order granting the integration application	14	(Pause given for response.)	
15	imposed contract's terms on the deemed leased owners	15	(No response.)	
16	only to the extent permitted under Idaho law.	16	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: On my Zoom portal, I	
17	If you have any questions, I would be happy to	17	don't see any unknown numbers. So I wanted to give them	
18	address those for you.	18	another opportunity.	
19	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Ms. Vega.	19	I'd like now to ask, are there any other	
	One question that I pose: Would you share industry		uncommitted mineral interest owners in the proposed unit	
	standards regarding factors used in setting "just and		that plan to participate today? In person, first, is	
	reasonable" terms? Again, Idaho, as everyone has said		anybody in the room?	
	so far, is a new state to this. So a broader, I think,	23	(Pause given for response.)	
	body of industry could help.	24	(No response.)	
25	MS. VEGA: And I agree, Mr. Thomas, that Idaho	25	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. In Zoom	
25	Wist v Lorr. Find Fagree, Witt Filonias, that Idano	25	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS. ORay: In 2001	
	Page 55		Page 57	
1		1		
	is a generally new state to oil and gas development. It		universe, is there anyone out there?	
2	is a generally new state to oil and gas development. It has existed for, I think, over a hundred years; however,	2	universe, is there anyone out there? (Pause given for response.)	
2 3	is a generally new state to oil and gas development. It has existed for, I think, over a hundred years; however, not to any great economic value. However, that could	2 3	universe, is there anyone out there? (Pause given for response.) HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I'm going to give you	
2 3 4	is a generally new state to oil and gas development. It has existed for, I think, over a hundred years; however, not to any great economic value. However, that could certainly change.	2 3 4	universe, is there anyone out there? (Pause given for response.) HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I'm going to give you about 20 seconds to find the mute button. Ah.	
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and	nd Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit May 20, 202				
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you Mr. Leader-Picone. I do have one question. There's another one, Helen Yost. Are you representing her as well? MR. LEADER-PICONE: No. Just Nancy Bankhead and Fallon Enterprises. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. Chris, let's go ahead to Helen and un-mute her and see if she would like to offer any comment. MR. GOZZO: Okay. I've asked her to un-mute. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Good afternoon, Helen. (Pause given for response.) (No response.) HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Well, that's fine. She doesn't have to say anything. I just wanted to make sure everybody had the opportunity to speak who was on our conference. All right, folks. I think that covers the parties who have signed up to speak today. At this time if you are, first, in person, and you would like to provide public comment, feel free to stand up, come to the podium. Again, I'm going to limit you to five minutes. (Pause given for response.)	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23			
24 25	(Pause given for response.) HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: No one is standing up	24 25	mineral rights. In this case, I think Malcolm Mr Ms.		
25	THE ART OF OTT TEEK THOMAS. NO OLE IS Stationing up	25	in uns case, i unik iviaconii ivii ivis.		
	Page 59		Page 61		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	in the room. MR. BROWN: I'll say something. HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. We do have one person. (Unintelligible.) HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Just call me hearing officer MR. BROWN: Hearing Officer? Richard Brown with Snake River. And I understand we're here to talk about "just and reasonable," and what would be discussed at so we're having a hearing to talk about "just and reasonable" to have another hearing. And I'm going to say that we, as the operator, are spending way too much money on hearings. Right now we're spending ten times more money on legal fees than we're spending on buying oil and gas leases and drilling oil and gas wells and producing oil and gas. So I would say that hopefully, at this next	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Bankhead's attorney was just on the phone. They are the largest owner in the unit, followed by Ms. Donohoe [phonetic] excuse me, Ms. Lockner. Next down to so we've got almost 90 percent of the unit that want us to drill a well, and we're prevented from doing so because we don't have an integration. So the other thing is, you-all just had testimony, you-all are going to lean on other states and what they do, and why don't we lean on other states in this regard as well. So integration in other states occurs in some window of a 90- to 120-day period. In this case we've been at this we're going to be pushing up to over 12 months when this is done. And there are not there's not multiple hearings in other states. There's typically so we've had spacing. We've got spacing. Now we're having a "just and reasonable" hearing. And then there's going		
19	hearing, that we have now defined what "just and	10	to be an integration hearing. In other states, there's		

anu	and Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit May 20, 2021			
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1	And I need to make sure that we all go ahead. I'm	1	So we have to go other places to do it.	
	not going to ask you a question. That's fine.	2	I have people working in Nevada, that are	
3	I wanted to say that I procedurally kind of		working in Washington; they're working in North Dakota.	
	broke my own rules here. I would have liked for Snake		They live here. They're all people that live in this	
	River to offer rebuttal before the comments began.		community, and they want to come home.	
6	I haven't forgotten about you-all, all right?	6	So that's why we put all this together years	
	We'll get to it.			
8	So let's go ahead and flow through the public	8	So that's pretty much all I have to say.	
	comments and I'll say to Snake River, for your rebuttal,	9	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr.	
	please don't consider any comments in your rebuttal.	-	Hatfield.	
11	MR. CHRISTIAN: Sure. I understand.	11	MR. HATFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Thomas.	
	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you.		HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I will say, before	
12	•	12	•	
13	Thank you, Mr. Brown. Do we have any other commenters? I don't see		Snake River comes up with their rebuttal, if you want to	
14	•		make if you want to provide comments, I'm willing to	
	anyone who hasn't been given the opportunity to speak		accept comments up to probably, let's say, 5 o'clock	
	yet. Anybody else in the room? Go ahead. State your		Mountain Time tomorrow, if you want to e-mail comments	
	name.		directly in to me. I just really want to give the	
18	MR. HATFIELD: My name is Bob Hatfield.		opportunity for everyone to speak.	
19	HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Mr. Hatfield? Go	19	I would say, I think, on our OGCC site	
20	ahead. I'll give you five minutes.		definitely if there is, contact us. Just go to the	
21	MR. HATFIELD: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.		OGCC.Idaho.gov, click on "contact," and we'll make sure	
22	I just wanted to say that, you know, we have a		your comments are recorded, again, up until 5 p.m.	
	small business here that we started here, and I've been		tomorrow, Mountain Time.	
	affiliated with the oil and gas thing here since 2010.	24	And with that, Snake River counsel, thank you	
25	And we've been on again, off again, on again,	25	for your patience. I invite you to come up and offer	
	Page 63		Page 65	
	Page 63		Page 65	
	off again. And we get on the bandwagon. We drill some		any rebuttal.	
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and	Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit		May 20, 2021
	Page 66		Page 68
1	implied from the statute. And of course he implied a	1	to keep in mind, what is it exactly that Judge Winmill
	broad range of things, up to and including an entirely		said, and what does the statute say about what the
	separate procedure and notice and subpoena power and		Commission does and what its ultimate goal is, what its
	every other other things that don't exist in the		ultimate purpose is.
	statute.	5	Mr. Piotrowski engaged in a discussion of
6	And my response is really just, to the extent		correlative rights which he said included, you know
-	that there are things that are directly contrary to what		he thinks it includes, or suggested it includes, the
	is set forth in the statute, by definition it can't be		right not to sell, and some other things. And again,
	necessarily implied from the statute.		the statute defines what correlative rights means.
10	If 47-328 says, here is the procedure upon	10	In making your decision, and the Commission
-	which we will process applications for integration, and	-	doing its job, it has to operate under the statutory
	the timeframes under which it will occur, and who may		definition that has been provided to it by the
	participate, and whether there may be discovery, and all		legislature. Because again, the Commission is a
	of those things; those are set in statute. That's the		preacher of statute and it has the power that the
	procedure. And you cannot imply, from the statute, some		legislature gave it and no more.
	other procedure which is well in excess and contrary to	16	And so it must use that definition. And so if
	that.	17	its job is to protect correlative rights, that means
18	And he stated in his comments about whether,		engage in processes and do those things that it can do,
19	you know, everything else [unintelligible] is on the	19	within the statutory framework, to ensure that all
20	table, the entire universe is on the table. Again,	20	interest holders have the opportunity to receive their
21	you've got to keep in mind, and I think we all have to	21	equitable share of production. Because that's the
22	keep in mind, what did Judge Winmill say; what was his	22	definition of correlative rights. And don't commit
	directive, what was the requirement of the federal court	23	waste. And that also is defined in the statute.
24	to do to comport with due process; that is, what factors	24	I think that's all I have to say about the
25	are you going to consider.	25	opposing mineral owners' comments.
	Page 67		Page 69
1	He recognized that the meaning of that term	1	With respect to Ms. Vega's comments on behalf
2	He recognized that the meaning of that term because it's not there's no definition of it in the	2	With respect to Ms. Vega's comments on behalf of the Department, I am not sure but I think we are
2 3	He recognized that the meaning of that term because it's not there's no definition of it in the statute is an item of discretion for the agency; in	2 3	With respect to Ms. Vega's comments on behalf of the Department, I am not sure but I think we are actually now on the same page about the scope of
2 3 4	He recognized that the meaning of that term because it's not there's no definition of it in the statute is an item of discretion for the agency; in this case for you, or if it's appealed, to the	2 3 4	With respect to Ms. Vega's comments on behalf of the Department, I am not sure but I think we are actually now on the same page about the scope of application of that definition of market value in
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	Page 70	_	
1	operator already has to do things. It has to submit an	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	application for a permit to drill, for example, or if it	2	
3	wants to plug a well, it has to follow certain standards	3	I, EMILY L. NORD, CSR NO. 695, Certified
4	that are set forth in the statute.	4	Shorthand Reporter, Certify:
5	If it wants to you know, its casing has to	5	That the audio recording of the proceedings were
6	meet certain standards, and cementing, and it has to	6	transcribed by me or under my direction;
7	report in certain ways.	7	That the foregoing is a true and correct
8	It isn't necessary to recite all of those	8	transcription of the audio recording, to the best of my
	things in the integration order. It's appropriate to	9	ability;
10	say, you know, do I, as the Administrator, when I look	10	I further certify that I am not a relative or
11	at the application, do I see anything that is possibly	11	employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially
12	contrary to what their obligation is under the law.	12	interested in the action.
13	I think it's a it's a very large and	13	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I set my hand and seal this
14	unwieldy and maybe impossible job for an operator to	14	2nd day of June, 2021.
15	say, in the universe of laws that could apply to my	15	
16	application and I'm going to show you how this	16	
17	application applies to every single one of them. That	17	Equadad
18	could go on for weeks, I think, in a research project.	18	
19	TI T	19	EMILY L. NORD, CSR, RPR
20	necessary. But certainly if either the Department, in	20	Notary Public
21	evaluating the application, or an opposing mineral owner	21	P.O. Box 2636
	has some suggestion that something that's included in an	22	Boise, Idaho 83701-2636
	application is out of [unintelligible] of the statute or	23	My Commission Expires November 5, 2023
	the rules, then certainly the operator ought to be	24	
25	prepared to respond to that.	25	
	Page 71	-	
	Ded the intention of one encoder I think		
1	But the intention of any operator, I think,		

2 that's supplying an application for integration is what 3 we've described, which is, what are the economic terms 4 upon which we're going to deal with uncommitted mineral 5 interests, with the knowledge that everything else we do 6 in our operation we're subject to the law and have to 7 comply with it, otherwise we're subject to penalties and 8 enforcement from the Department and the Commission. I think those are all the comments I have. 9 HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. 10 Christian. And again -- well, to everyone, virtually 11 and in the room, thank you for participating. I will 12 13 take this matter under advisement and issue a written description -- decision within 30 calendar days of this 14 15 hearing. 16 That adjourns our hearing. Thank you very 17 much. Chris, you can stop recording. 18 (End of audio recording.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Hearing May 20, 2021

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