## Audio Transcription

BEFORE THE IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LANDS

In the Matter of the Application )
of Snake River Oil and Gas, LIC, ) Docket No.
to Integrate the Spacing Unit $\quad$ CC-2021-OGR-01-001
Consisting of the $S E 1 / 4$ of
Section 10, the SW 1/4 of )
Section 11, NW 1/4 of Section 14,)
and the NE $1 / 4$ of Section 15 , )
Township 8 North, Range 5 West, )
Boise Meridian, Payette County, )
Idaho. )
Snake River Oil and Gas, LLC, )
Applicant. )

HEARING TO DETERMINE "JUST AND REASONABLE" FACTORS

DATE/TIME: MAY 20, 2021, at 1:00 p.m.
LOCATION: Fruitland City Hall, 200 S. Whitney Dr., Fruitland, ID.

TRANSCRIBED BY:

EMILY L. NORD, CSR No. 695, RPR
Notary Public

"watch hearing" on Facebook Live link.
2 The documents in this record, Docket No.
3 CC-2021-OGR-01-001 are on the OGCC website at
4 OGCC.Idaho.gov/administrative hearings.
5 As my April 6th, 2021, notice indicates, this
6 hearing is addressing scope of factors used to determine
7 "just and reasonable." I am not addressing today what
8 terms are in fact "just and reasonable." That is a
question for a future evidentiary hearing held at a
later date.
I have allowed briefing and submittal of affidavits on the issue of the scope of factors used to determine "just and reasonable," and I plan to take argument at that -- pardon me -- take only argument at this hearing.

Before I go any further, I want to address a request I received from the Dorsings to be admitted as a party. My understanding, based on the application and their request, is that the Dorsings are uncommitted mineral interest owners in the spacing unit in this matter. Given that, and that they have responded, they are already a part of the proceeding, to this proceeding. You may participate in this hearing. Just keep in mind the focus is to determine the scope of factors I'll use to determine whether terms are "just

## Page 7

and reasonable," not whether a certain term or certain terms proposed are in fact "just and reasonable."

Also, I want to again clarify that the
deadline for uncommitted owners to respond to this
application has not passed, and they can still
participate in future evidentiary hearings on the
integration application. Witnesses and evidence may be
submitted at that evidentiary hearing.
We'll proceed with this hearing as follows: I
will first hear arguments from the applicant Snake
River. This will be followed by argument from
uncommitted owners within the proposed unit. Afterward,
I will accept argument from the Idaho Department of
Lands. Then Snake River will have an opportunity for rebuttal.

After argument is complete, I will accept public comments. I will limit these comments to five minutes. I'll first take up the comments from those appearing in person. I will then take comments from those appearing on Zoom.

I would like for everyone who speaks to state 2 your name for the record. If you are here as a
23 representative, please indicate your own name as well as
24 who you're representing. I may ask clarifying questions
25 while you speak.

That said, will Snake River's representative please identify themselves for the record.
Mr. Christian, since you're the first one
here, I want to make sure that everything is operating.
5 So, Chris, we're getting a little feedback now. 9 ahead.
0 MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you, Mister Administrator.

I'm Michael Christian. I'm the attorney for Snake River Oil and Gas, LLC, the Applicants.

Just as a preliminary comment, I'm going to spend some time on some things that you probably --

1 you've already seen in briefing. I want to try to focus or bring some focus to the discussion. Then I'm going to spend some time responding to some of the arguments that have been made by the opposing mineral owners or the Department.

And if I'm redundant, I apologize. If you think you've heard enough on the subject and you want me to move on, please tell me, because I don't want to take up any more of your time than is necessary.

As I think we're all aware, we're here to discuss what factors should be considered in determining what are "just and reasonable" terms of integration under the Idaho Oil and Conservation Act. This is because of the decision in the CAIA vs. Schultz case.

The directive of the federal court in that case, in its memorandum decision it ordered in August of 2018, was to, quote, "hold a new hearing that complies with due process by explaining the factors that will be considered when determining whether the terms and conditions of an integration order are 'just and reasonable,'" unquote.

In other words, this process, and the rounds of briefing that were made directly to the Commission some time ago, is perhaps [unintelligible] but I don't believe at least explicitly required by Judge Winmill's

1 order in CAIA versus Schultz. In fact, he stated, in his Memorandum Decision, that "holding a new hearing will impose relatively few financial or administrative costs on the Defendants. The hearing will involve the same issues, parties, and facts that the previous one did. The only change required will be the specification of the basis on which Defendants determine factors to be relevant or irrelevant to the determination of "just and reasonable" terms.

Before this, in his Memorandum Decision, he had described the case as a close one. In other words, that the amount of additional process that was due should not be extensive. And he had said that "the Commission has a significant amount of discretion to decide what 'just and reasonable' means."

He stated that his order did "not affect the hearing officers' ability to exclude irrelevant or unnecessary testimony or evidence, or the Commission's discretion to determine what facts should be considered when determining whether terms and conditions of an integration order are 'just and reasonable.'"

In other words, what he appears to have intended was simply that an integration hearing would be re-held, but that prior to it, the Commission or the Department would describe factors that would be

Page 11
1 considered in determining "just and reasonable" terms of 2 integration as an exercise of its discretion.

So far, I think that is not what has happened.
4 After multiple rounds of briefing and argument to the
5 Commission on the subject of what factors should be
6 used, we've now engaged in more rounds of briefing
specific to this application -- and I think there was a previous application that was eventually abandoned where
the same thing happened -- and Snake River has filed
another integration application beyond this one. And at
this time at least another [unintelligible] with more rounds of briefing.

This is not a process that is undertaken in any other producing state. I am not aware of any other producing state that has a pooling or integration process that goes beyond essential economic lease and joint-operating-agreement terms; royalty, bonus, term, risk penalty, participation options, and the like. It would be a relatively simple task to describe a set of factors bearing on those issues.

Now, as Judge Winmill said, "the Commission has a significant amount of discretion," and it has exercised it by choosing this procedure. I recite all of this to emphasize a couple of things.

First, that what I think is an extraordinary
amount of process has already been extended to the participants in getting to this point.

Second, that in deciding where and how far to go after this, I again respectfully suggest that the Administrator and the Department must keep in mind the stated purpose of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the scope of their and the Commission's authority.

The Commission is not an all-encompassing
regulator of all subjects. It does not police their
party contracts. It does not make economic decisions for operators. Its primary purpose is to encourage production while ensuring different interest holders are able to receive their equitable share of production while preventing waste.

While it does have a role to play in ensuring safe drilling and production operations and protection of surface elements, that role is largely accomplished through existing requirements in the Act of the Commission's rules.

This will not be the first time that you've heard me repeat this, but the Act states that it is a public policy of the State "to foster, encourage, and promote the development, production and utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the State of Idaho in such a manner as will prevent waste, to provide

Page 13
for uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the production of oil and gas throughout the State of Idaho, to authorize and to provide for the operations and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained and that the correlative rights of all owners be fully protected."

All of this is to the end "that the greatest possible economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end that the landowners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general public may realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural resources."

As I've described in briefing, "correlative rights" is defined in the Act to mean "the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable share of oil and gas in a pool without waste."

I've also described in the briefing that "waste" is defined in the Act as being concerned with maximizing the ultimate production of oil and gas from a pool.

Because the Commission was created by statute, our Supreme Court has held, in more than one case, that it has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has specifically granted to it. I think

Page 14
I've cited the Idaho Power vs. IPUC case in briefing. And the Department, of course, is the administrative arm of the Commission.

The Commission, as you know, is given
jurisdiction and authority over all persons and
property, public and private, necessary to enforce the
provisions of the Act, and it has power and authority to
make and enforce rules, regulations and orders, and do
whatever may be reasonably necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Act.
Similarly, the Act provides that the
Commission is authorized, and it is its duty, to
regulate the exploration for and production of oil and
gas, prevent waste of oil and gas, and to protect
correlative rights and otherwise administer and enforce the Act.

The Act directs that in the event of conflict, prevention of waste is paramount.

All of this is -- most of it's in 47-314 and 315. Although a thorough reading of Section 315 of the Act makes it clear that the focus -- makes clear the focus of the Commission's [unintelligible], to encourage production, protect correlative rights, and prevent waste.

There is reference to surface owners in 315,

Page 15
1 sub 2 , but it's only as a modifier to protecting
correlative rights by administering the provisions of the chapter, and it goes on.

So how does the Commission do this? How does this happen?

First, the Act covers several subjects. Well spacing and drilling location requirements were set out s in Sections 317 and 318 of the Act. Requirements for
setbacks are laid out in Section 319. Royalty payment
and recording requirements are provided in Sections 331
and 332. Surface owner protections are provided in Section 334.

And, Second, the Commission's [inaudible] promulgated rules covering drilling, well construction, well treatments, production, reclamation, and other operational requirements in IDAPA 20.07.02.

It is useful, I think, in reaching "just and reasonable" terms, to evaluate whether a proposed term or condition exceeds these requirements. In other words, if an operator proposes terms that are otherwise economically reasonable in comparison to those 2 involuntary leases in the area, where joint operating 23 agreements in use, or in other mature producing states, 24 or as between the operator and its working interest 25 partners, and the operator is subject to the operational

1 requirements of the Act and the rules as I've
summarized, is it just and reasonable to require the
operator's other requirements with respect to
uncommitted mineral owners, which go much further.
The opposing mineral owners, in their
briefing, suggested the term "just and reasonable" must
apply to every other element of Section 320 of the Act
relating to integration, apparently so as to prevent
anyone opposing integration to engage in an
investigation and challenge of every other element -i.e., location, drilling, equipping and operation of the well -- as part of the integration process. The statute, Section 320, of course does not say this, nor is it necessarily implied.

As previous orders have done, and virtually every integration and pooling order in every other producing state does, as near as I can tell, the order may simply, as the statute says, authorize the drilling and operation of the well and designate the operator. The details of drilling and operations are dealt within the permit to drill, issued pursuant to Section 316 of the Act, and under the drilling and casing, testing, treating, completion, metering, reporting, plugging, and other rules set forth in IDAPA 20.07.02.

To impose requirements differing from those
rules would render them effectively [unintelligible]; and to impose different conditions in different units, far from bringing uniformity of regulation as the Act calls for, would cause us to end up with the exact opposite, a hodgepodge of requirements varying by unit. This is obviously not what the Act contemplates or intends.

Moreover, these are specific outcomes. They are not factors to be considered. And as such, I think they're beyond the scope of the hearing.

In any case, there is already, in multiple ways, ways mineral owners can participate more deeply in operations. First, as provided in the Act, under an integration order they can elect to participate in a well, sign the joint operating agreement, in which case they can be on equal footing with other working interest partners who invest in and take on the risk of the well. This is a difference between a participating interest and a royalty interest.

Second, they also have existing avenues for relief if they think an operator is violating the Act and the rules. They can file a complaint with the Commission, for example, under Section 328.

One indication of what the integration statute

1 may participate in the integration process, uncommitted mineral interest owners, per Section 328(3)(b), which 3 led to my objection and briefing to CAIA's
4 participation, because it's not an uncommitted mineral 5 interest owner.

That means, contrary to the opposing mineral interest owner's suggestion, that those who do not own an uncommitted mineral interest in the unit are not subject to participation as parties; not mobile home park residents in the unit, not other people who do not own mineral rights in the unit.

The suggestion, near the end of the opposing mineral owners' opening brief, that "just and reasonable" terms should be based on the input of all property owners, not just mineral owners -- and I think that's a quote -- with notice and expansion of the proceedings, is contrary to Section 328(3)(b). And again, this is a specific outcome, not a factor. I don't think this is even the venue to argue about whether the factual assertions that the opposing mineral owners make in support of that position are true. Those are issues, I think, for the legislature, if anyone.

The procedural due process arguments the opposing mineral owners make, essentially that the entire process should be made even longer, should

1 involve subpoena power to the mineral owners, and should
involve the Department engaging experts to investigate
market conditions, quote, "viability of collection,
processing and transmission facilities," are, again,
directly contrary to the Act and, again, are specific
outcomes, not factors.
But they also completely ignore Judge
Winmill's decision in CAIA vs. Schultz, wherein he said,
again, it was a close case and that the only change
necessary to meet due process requirements was to tell
uncommitted mineral interest owners ahead of time what
factors would be considered. This is an exercise of discretion by the Commission and the Department, and the opposing mineral owners would take virtually all of that discretion away.

As an aside, the characterization of the opposing mineral owners at the beginning of their reply brief, that Snake River is offering "awful, miserly, or merely irrelevant compensation terms and trying to avoid all accountability for harm," are beyond not being factually supported at all, just wrong, and I don't think helpful to this discussion.

Most of what they leave out of their argument

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condition to a taking was [unintelligible] reached. It has nothing to do with the issues here and does not stand for the proposition that the opposing mineral owners have cited it for.

Likewise, the citations to rate-setting cases in the opposing mineral owners' outgoing brief are not relevant here. The Act has specific provisions, and Judge Winmill's decision was quite limited in its scope.

I'm not going to repeat for you the factors that we propose on behalf of Snake River, other than to comment that we submit that the factors can be fitted within the scope and purpose of the Act; and, second, that they are still, I think, well beyond what is implied in other producing states with similar statutory schemes.

In my reply briefing I think I directed you to a couple of examples of pooling [unintelligible] from Arkansas and Wyoming. Both have pooling or integration statutes which are or if not identical, pretty analogous to Idaho's. In neither case does the order go anywhere near as far as the opposing mineral owners or the Department would have you go.

In fact, I went and looked earlier today on Wyoming's Oil and Gas Commission's website, and that form of order is a template. In every statutory pooling
proceeding, that form of order is used. I printed it off. I think I have a copy of it. But -- and with blanks for the numbers, basically, for what the royalty should be, what the risk penalty should be, what the bonus should be. But effectively, that's the form that's used. And it's consistent with the form of order for Arkansas as well.

I think everything else that I have to say is set forth well enough in our briefing. I don't want to
take up any more time. And I'll take any questions you may have.

HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Christian. Hold on just a moment. I want to shut this door because I'm hearing some rattling back here.
(Brief pause in proceedings.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I've got just a few more general questions for the audience that I was going to address before I invited you up.

Are the Dorsings in attendance today? Are they here via Zoom? I just want to make sure.
(Pause given for response.)
(No response.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Well, whether they speak up now or not, I just want to make sure they knew they were invited.

## Page 23

1 Thank you, Mr. Christian. I have a few questions. You answered the first one, I believe, 3 pretty well in the opening brief, but I'm going to put 4 it to you because I wanted to ask the other parties the same question as well.

Thank you for the information you provide in your brief regarding industry standards when regarding "just and reasonable" factors. Could you share, for the
audience and for those on virtually, what some of the
industry standards are when setting "just and reasonable" terms?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That's a broad question, but -- well, there are a couple of things. For example, if you look at the forms of order that I gave you from Wyoming and Arkansas, there are forms of lease and forms of joint operating agreement that have been in use in those areas for some time and are accepted. That's one thing.

So by analogy here, you know, we have forms of 19 lease that have been used in the -- we'll call it the
21 valley generally, across -- call it a thousand leases or
22 so, over the last ten to twelve years. And we can draw
23 information from those about what is just and reasonable
24 in terms of what the market has been over a broad area.
25
So, for example, I would say ninety-nine point
surface. So it is somewhat fact-dependent.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you. Your
3 brief says that the IDL proposes terms that go beyond
4 the Act's purpose and would impose terms and conditions
5 regarding subjects over which the OGCC lacks authority.
6 If that is the case, would the scope of "just and
7 reasonable" terms, and ultimately an integration order,
8 be limited to economic terms and therefore not address
unrelated proposed terms?
MR. CHRISTIAN: I think the vast majority of the consideration is economic terms, and that's what's reflected in integration or statutory pooling orders from other states. They are concerned with, again, correlative rights and prevention of waste, which is to say, making sure that those uncommitted mineral interest owners get their fair share, that they have their opportunity to receive their equitable share of production.

I think, you know, following up on the last question you just asked, there are some operational considerations you could take into account, a 12-inch line across somebody's front yard on the surface. Well, I mean, to the extent it's not already answered by either the statute -- the Act or the rules, my argument and comment to you earlier was, the vast majority of

## Page 27

1 that subject matter is already covered by the Act and 2 the rules. The operator has to follow the Act and the rules in how it conducts itself.

And there are -- and I think I set it out in
some more detail in my briefing -- there are notice and
opportunity for hearing requirements and opportunities
for surface owners or uncommitted mineral interest
owners to participate over a number of different
subjects.
For example, I've got -- you know, if an
operator wants to engage in well treatment, they have to
give notice to, you know, a certain surrounding area.
And those people have an opportunity, if they want to
have a hearing, to talk about it, or at least comment on
it. When well permit applications are filed, they're
posted on the Department's website, and those folks have
an opportunity to comment on them. And then the
Department can take that into consideration.
So I think that there's a -- that the sphere
of consideration into operational issues in an
integration order is pretty limited. I don't think it's
zero, but I think it's pretty limited because of statute
rules.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay, thank you. One
25 follow-up question: If there are noneconomic lease
terms proposed, how should I reconcile that request with the argument you just made, that scope of factors should be limited to economic terms, at least predominantly economic terms?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I think you have to -- you
would compare what's proposed with -- mostly, with
what's already out there in the market. What have a thousand voluntary lessors agreed to? And what have the -- you know, what's in place in the -- I don't know how many producing units we have right now. Maybe six. But there have been more -- you know, what's in place in those areas that were successfully produced or continue to be successfully produced? Those would be two obvious places to look.

So I guess what I'm saying is, it's -- you know, I guess the question is, what's the noneconomic term? There are -- you know, basically how long the lease is going to be for. Is there an option, and how long should it be?

That could also be dependent upon whether -either whether there's a well already in the unit or whether there's already a drilling permit proposed, for example. It would be reasonable for you to ask, I think, well, if there's a well in the unit, you know, what should the primary term be?

Page 29
Because, you know, assuming that the order gets entered and there's some provision for extension -for example, if it gets appealed or it's litigated or whatever. You know, once it gets to the point where it is a final order, it's not unreasonable to say you, the operator, should turn the well on soon. But, you know, those are factors you could take into consideration.

But mostly I think it is a comparison to what's in the market.

HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Christian. Those are all the questions I have for you right now.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Next I'm going to call on Mr. Piotrowski. Let's make sure he's -- Mr. Piotrowski, can you speak and make sure we all hear you and everything?

MR. PIOTROWSKI: I -- I certainly can speak.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. We're hearing you. Very good. Before you begin, I have a question. Could you please state who you represent and, specifically, parties within its unit?

MR. PIOTROWSKI: Yes, I certainly can. I'm
James Piotrowski. I'm here on behalf of Kevin and Margery Plevenger, Kristina \& Lynn Larsen, as well as

1 Citizens Alliance for Integrity and Accountability in its representational role, representing its members in the unit, which includes the Plevengers and the Larsens.

Mr. Thomas, you have a difficult job here.
5 HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Stand by. I 6 apologize for that. I want to make sure that people in the audience can hear. I just had someone jump up. So hold your momentum. We'll get you right back.

MR. PIOTROWSKI: Will do.
(Brief pause in proceedings.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Now, that's about as loud as he's going to go. If you'd like to walk up and hear better, you can.

Okay, Mr. Piotrowski, go ahead.
MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you.
Mr. Thomas, you have been given a rather difficult job, and through no fault of your own; although, through some fault of the oil and gas industry, frankly. You are asked to address, in this particular step of the proceeding, the factors that will be considered in determining "just and reasonable." You are doing so against a background that gives you very little information.

And that is not your fault. That is the fault of the fact that the American justice system has finally

Page 31
come to realize the enormous challenges posed to
2 existing property law and constitutional law by the oil
3 and gas industry, which -- and is doing so -- in the
4 case of you and I, Mr. Thomas, doing so in a location
5 where we are not well-versed in these things.
Mr. Christian has given some effort to presenting, to you, integration orders and integration proceedings from other locations. Normally that would
be useful and helpful to you. However, again, we're
doing so in an environment where you face the unique
challenge that, for whatever reason, over the last
hundred-plus years, very few property owners have chosen
-- almost no property owners or mineral rights owners
have chosen to ask the question, can you -- and you, the
State -- take our property and force us to sell it to somebody else.

And so you're stuck with the situation in which the only guidance you have, in addressing some of this, is the very clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court that says that, in circumstances like this, whether it is rate setting or integration, the constitutional requirement is the same as the statutory requirement. That is to say, that the terms you set must be just and reasonable.

And frankly, for reasons that escape me,
despite a strong interest in constitutional history, nobody has, over the last now 80 years, gone back to the courts to say, well, what does "just and reasonable" mean in this particular context. A different kind of question. And it's a question we raise, and it's a question we will continue to raise; "we" meaning my clients, the minerals owner in this case; my clients, the mineral owners in the other cases currently pending; and, in general, the people of Idaho.

So you have to reach this decision, Mr. Thomas, and you have very little to guide you.

Now, I will do my best to provide you what I think is reasonable guidance and have done so. The process we're using to do this is also somewhat a challenge. Snake River's lawyer is unhappy at the process that was chosen, but that process has been chosen by the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. It was their decision to use the case-by-case approach. That was not the approach that they were forced into. It was not -- it was an approach that was certainly considered by multiple parties. But it is the choice made by the Commission.

We are here today on this particular integration application, not through any fault of [unintelligible], not through any fault of the
landowners; but by the fact that Snake River Oil and Gas chose to file this application at the time it chose.
And so if there has been delay, if there have been difficulties, they are not the result of anybody else's conduct. They are the result of the conduct of Alta Mesa Idaho, now bankrupt, and Snake River Oil and Gas, the current holder of the operational rights.

So we're here, and the process of getting here was not the process chosen by any of the parties before you except for Snake River Oil and Gas. So you're stuck with trying to figure out what factors should be included. And we think that, and we have presented our briefs, our belief that that comes down to what we call implied statutory factors, although some of them are expressed statutory factors; the constitutional factors, which includes both procedural and substantive due process factors; and what I think we can go ahead and agree to call a separate category of procedural factors. I don't necessarily view them that way, but Mr. Christian, in his response brief, did view them that way so we're happy to address them on those terms.

And so I want to talk briefly about each of those categories, because I think each of them is important, and I think each of them is going to be important to the future courts who finally get to do the

1 job of deciding what does "just and reasonable" mean in 2 the constitutional setting as applied to this process.

So let's start with a short discussion of the
statutory purpose. Now, there is an express stated legislative purpose. That is the statement that 6 Mr. Christian and Snake River Oil and Gas routinely
7 bring out; although they, for fairly obvious reasons,
8 focus on only the first statement of purpose, that statement being the one that it is the public policy of the State to encourage production. But, in fact, the statutory purposes go far beyond that and are express.

The first purposes are relatively obvious. Clearly, if the legislature had anything in mind about what constitutes just and reasonable, it would be the things they actually wrote about in their own legislation. So that's relatively clear.

But there are also unstated but reasonably assumed -- I'm not even talking about implied, but just reasonable assumed statutory factors. The discretion of determining what these factors would be was left not expressly but by implication, as recognized by the Federal District Court, to the Commission and the Administrator.

And a clearly required statutory purpose was the assumption that you and the Commission would

## Page 35

1 exercise that discretion in compliance with the law.
2 The assumption was certainly not that you would step out 3 and try to violate the law. And had that been the 4 assumption, I doubt you would have taken the job. The 5 assumption is, you will do your best to perform your 6 task while complying with all existing law, and that's hard where the law is poorly developed in this particular [unintelligible].

The factors for "just and reasonable" are still undefined. You have to figure out what they are. And you have to do so, unfortunately, in this context of insufficient prior determinations by courts as to what those factors would be.

So there's the statutory purpose and the clearly unstated but nonetheless necessary statutory purpose of complying with the law.

There are also implied statutory factors. And 18 the implied statutory factors are fundamentally
19 everything that relates to the relationship between a 20 middle rights lessor and lessee, other than the royalty 21 rate and the bonus payment. The royalty rate is set by 22 statute for uncommitted owners, shall receive a $1 / 8$ 23 royalty. The bonus payment is set by statute at the 24 maximum level paid to a voluntary lessor. So you have 25 no discretion to address those, which means that
literally every other factor that might go into these terms is something that should be evaluated to determine its effect on whether the overall proposal is just and reasonable.

Now, the legislature was not and cannot be assumed to have been expert in what are the terms that make up an oil and gas lease. And so that's why these factors are implied. They left that to you. And those are the factors, both the statutory purpose factors and the implied statutory factors, that are set out in our brief, and I don't wish to repeat them here.

There are also the -- what I'm going to call the constitutional factors. Now, it's important, in addressing these, to understand a couple of points that are not [unintelligible]. First of all, the uncommitted owners are not asking you, Mr. Thomas, to decide that any part of the statute is unconstitutional. That is beyond your authority, in all likelihood there's certainly an administrative law argument to that point to be made, and we are not asking you to make that determination.

In fact, we are making exactly the opposite argument, which is to say that the statute is constitutional as long as the terms set in the integration order are just and reasonable. And it is

1 not constitutional if those terms are not just and reasonable.

So we are not asking you to find that the statute is invalid in any way. And so any search into that effect is just simply incorrect. In fact, we're asking you to make sure that the statute is valid.

Second, the decision of the court in CAIA vs. Schultz decided a relatively narrow issue, and did so, and then fundamentally stopped. And that is the way courts in the Anglo-American tradition have always proceeded. It's a doctrine called "constitutional avoidance." You decide a case -- judges in America are taught to decide a case on the narrowest grounds you can, and then if that does resolve the case, don't go any further.

And that's what Judge Winmill did in this case. He concluded that the failure to define the phrase "just and reasonable" was a due process violation adequate to invalidate the prior proceeding that was addressed in that case. And to fix that problem, he provided a particular remedy. And the court did not go on to address the many other due process arguments that the plaintiffs in that case had raised because it wasn't necessary to do so. And this is how American courts work.

1 2 judgment in CAIA vs. Schultz; that is to say, and as 3 Mr. Christian did say, simply telling us what the 4 factors are. While that is adequate to satisfy the 5 requirement in CAIA vs. Schultz, it would be extremely 6 shortsighted to assume that that also means everything
7 else under the broad rubric of due process of law is 8 also satisfied.
9 This is further demonstrated by the fact that
10 despite Mr. Christian pointing out the nature of 11 integration orders from several other states, he is unable to cite a single case from a federal court, sitting as a constitutional reviewer, that has said, oh, yeah, these factors are acceptable and are adequate to satisfy due process. That's not his fault. He can't do that because, as far as I can tell, such a case does not exist. The question has not been answered.

So, Mr. Thomas, again, coming back to where I started, you have the task of deciding, in the first instance, what does the constitution require to make something just and reasonable so that the statute is valid. This isn't addressed in prior integration orders for Idaho. It isn't addressed in integration orders from other states. It isn't addressed in prior constitutional challenges to integration orders, either

## Page 39

from Idaho or elsewhere, because they simply don't exist.

Now, that may seem odd in an industry as big as oil and gas, in a nation as large as the United States, but I can assure you it's not odd. There are many issues that have simply never been decided, and yet we have to deal with them.

So what do -- you know, your job, in assuring that the statute is valid and is validly applied in this and other cases, is to look at what are the issues that are going to be necessary to satisfy the law.

We think you can break those down into wee, broad categories. One is the substantive due process categories, and those are expressed and have been developed to a very limited extent in what are called the rate-setting cases.

I think you have to address the understanding of correlative rights, not only as the right to produce and sell one's gas and oil, but also as the right to decline to produce and sell one's gas and oil.

And then, finally, you have to ensure that 21 And then, finally, you here's a procedure that will be adequate, because, 23 ultimately, there is and will always be a deprivation of 24 property rights going on in this process. You will, if 25 you enter the integration order at all, which you are

1 obligated to do at some point, you will be telling
somebody we are selling -- we, the State of Idaho, are
selling your property to somebody else. That's the nature of integration.

So those are the three things I think to address. I'm not necessarily going to take those in order.

In determining, first, the issue of
correlative rights. Mr. Thomas, not surprisingly -- as
a representative of the oil and gas industry that
doesn't own, doesn't have any holding of any of these
mineral rights -- necessarily, folks, is on the rights
of individuals that produce their gas. But the
ownership of the thing includes both the right to sell it and the right to keep it.

And so a proper analysis of correlative rights is going to include balancing of the rights of those who want to produce against those who think it's not the right time, those who think it's not a very good deal, those who think it harms their property more than it helps it.

And so natural recognition of a right not to sell is an important first step in understanding, what are you going to order be done when that right is denied [unintelligible].

Page 41
1 [Unintelligible] we should talk about the procedural methods here. The oil and gas companies want a fast, inexpensive, stripped-down procedure that makes it harder for mineral rights owners to make a case for what are "just and reasonable" terms. But these procedural steps that we've requested are critical.

I can give you a great example that we're facing already. While it is true that the vast majority of mineral and gas -- oil and gas leases in Idaho have been at a $1 / 8$ royalty and a $\$ 100$ bonus payment, we know, because Mr. Christian has told us, that in some cases a greater bonus payment was made. And I certainly, for one, appreciate his integrity in disclosing that.

I have serious questions, however, about the integrity of the oil and gas industry. It's America, in 2021. Everyone has questions about the integrity of the oil and gas industry. And if we don't have the ability to subpoena records, we have no way of proving whether or not a different bonus payment was made.

We have no way of knowing whether or not Snake River Oil and Gas is trying to impose terms on mineral owners that it would never even accept for its own mineral rights. We have no way of knowing whether in fact Snake River Oil and Gas has the leaseholds that they claim to have if we can't test the truth of their

Page 42
statements.
And that's what this procedure that we're
proposing is about, and, yes, it looks an awful lot like a court proceeding. But that's the tool that American jurisprudence has chosen, to test the truth of facts.

So things like giving us adequate time to prepare, providing us subpoena power, providing us the ability to actively and, when necessary, aggressively cross-examine those who are making statements under oath to you, are all tools for finding the truth.

And that is also very closely related to the final category, which is to recognize the substantive rights of mineral holders. In addition to their right to decline, if they are forced to sell despite their right to decline, then the rate-setting cases -- which is very much what you're doing here, Mr. Thomas. You're setting a rate. It's just not -- it's not the royalty rate or the bonus rate, but it's everything else that goes into what are the terms of sale.

The law in this teaches us that there are a lot of factors involved, that a lot of those factors are really economic. It is hard to imagine a better example where the economic and the noneconomic are actually identical. If you're going to force somebody to sell what is under their property, then the harm you do to

Page 43
the surface estate is an economic harm.
If, in the course of forcing someone to sell
their subsurface estate, or a portion of their
subsurface estate, you destroy the value of their
surface estate, that's an economic harm.
If you force somebody to sell their mineral rights at a below-market rate, then you are not only violating due process, you are doing economic harm.

The fact that something is economic does not
mean it is unimportant. It does not mean it doesn't
have constitutional significance. In fact, it means quite the opposite. Where economic harm is done, the law of due process is always held. It is much easier to prove that there is a deprivation of an interest that requires due process of law. So the argument that this is purely economic and therefore somehow excluded from constitutional consideration wouldn't be more wrong.

The combination of the correlative rights of nonconsenting owners, the procedural tools that are used to find the truth and to protect the interests of everybody involved in a transaction, and the substantive due process rights related to ensuring that the overall terms of sale are fair and reasonable, are all related. And so you can't have one without the other.

To that end, our position is a fairly simple
one, if not -- if not an easy one, which is to say, we are about to engage in the process of telling people that we are going to take something they paid for, against their will, on terms they don't approve of, and we're going to sell it to someone else. This is an exercise of State power over people's homes. Let's not pretend otherwise. And that implicates fundamental rights at an incredible level.

So to that end, the factors we have identified, and the factors that the Department of Lands has identified, are both highly relevant to determine what is just and reasonable.

And, finally, if you find yourself uncertain of which way to go, sir, which I wouldn't blame you for, we can go back to -- I mean, literally and directly, to the statute itself. What is just. What is reasonable.

It is not just to come to somebody and say, I want to sell my gas, so I'm going to make you pay a price for that, even though you don't want to buy my gas.

It is not just for a corporate oil and gas operator to come and say, we're going to shift the costs of our operation on to people who didn't want anything to do with it in the first place.

It is not just to come to people and to say,
we're going to let these people -- we're going to let
these outsiders, these people who you don't owe anything to, come to your land, drill under your property, and if they happen to poison your groundwater, well, we're not going to do anything about that.
"Just and reasonable" implies fairness. It implies a good deal. It implies that nobody is shifting their costs on to anybody else. And it implies that everybody who didn't want to participate in this deal that's being forced on them, be able to walk away in no worse position than they are right now. When this is all said and done, everybody should be in a better position than they were before it started.

And right now, with the terms proposed by Snake River Oil and Gas, we don't think that's the case and that's what we think the upcoming hearing should address, how to make sure that that happens.

As Mr. Christian admitted whether or not, for instance, surface use of the subject estates is appropriate and within "just and reasonable" is highly contextual. It will depend on the facts on the ground.

And so that is why you face this task of trying to decide, in each case, one at a time, what is just and reasonable.

Here, where the spacing unit includes both

Page 46
industrial and agriculture and residential, and I don't honestly remember whether this particular spacing unit includes municipal property, but where all of those things are in existence, then the factors to be considered should reflect all of those things.

If this were purely a spacing unit that consisted of nothing but 640 acres of rangeland, it would be a different case. That is not the case we have. And the factors you choose should reflect the interests of everybody who will be affected, including the homeowners that are my clients here.

I would be happy to answer any questions.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Piotrowski. I've just got a few questions for you, and then I am going to have a courtesy 15 -minute break for people in the room and whatnot, and then we'll come back. But let's address -- let's go to a couple of questions first.

First, with the people you represent, are they members of CAIA?

## MR. PIOTROWSKI: Yes, they are.

HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you.
And I'll pose this question to you; it's the single question I'm going to pose to everyone: Could you share what industry standards are regarding factors

Page 47
used in setting "just and reasonable" terms.
MR. PIOTROWSKI: The industry standards, to my research, vary from place to place and are developing
4 over time. The form contract that Mr. Christian
5 continually points to, and that is included as part of
6 their application and is apparently the basis of the
7 voluntary leases they've entered into, is very broadly
s written and is written in such a way that it can address
many different types of operations.
And so, for instance, the industry standards
in North Dakota will be different from industry
standards in western Pennsylvania, and those will be different from industry standards in west Texas. And those standards are highly contextual.

Here in Idaho, those alleged thousands of leases that Mr. Christian speaks of, the vast majority of those were entered into by one company, Alta Mesa and its affiliates. And so it doesn't tell us much about industry standards here in southwest Idaho.

Those standards have yet to be developed here

We don't have industry standards established

1 statutory requirements that enable the integration of 2 the uncomitted mineral interest owners, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 47-320 and IDAPA 20.07.02.

Additionally through this process, evidence may be accepted as to what "just and reasonable" factors have been established as a result of this hearing.

IDL's input on the identification of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions matters, because the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has delegated most of its powers and duties, vested by law, to the Department. IDL has authority and obligation to administer or enforce most of the provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, whether by expressed declaration of the legislature, or a delegation by the Commission.

The statutes, rules, and contract-based considerations identified in IDL's opening brief are each factors that it has identified as being necessary or relevant in the event a final order is issued integrating the uncommitted mineral interest owners in the spacing unit that was established, I believe in 2020, in Docket OGR 01-002.

Section A of the Idaho Department of Lands' opening brief addresses just a couple surface-use factors that may integrate -- or, excuse me, that may

## Page 51

1 impact integrated parcels. If a surface use of an 2 integrated parcel is addressed in the integration order, 3 the terms of the order may substitute or supersede the 4 surface-use provisions in the standard lease form that 5 has been submitted by Snake River Oil and Gas at 6 Exhibit D to the application.
7 As an example, the application cover letter indicates that no drilling activities will occur on parcels to be integrated in the spacing unit. If that statement is presented with evidentiary support in the integration hearing, the Department recommends that such a limitation be included and made part of the actual integration order.

Another example would be whether the applicant intends for other surface uses, so other than the drilling location, on any of the integrated parcels. If the evidence presented at the integration hearing is that no surface uses are expected on any of those integrated parcels, then that limitation should be made part of the order, which, in turn, would supersede certain surface-use terms in the applicant's standard lease, including the Exhibit B to that lease form.

Section B of the Department's opening brief identifies four sections of Title 47, chapter 3, that 5 pertain to royalties. These are relevant factors to an
integration proceeding because Idaho Code 47-320
provides that the Department, "May prescribe the terms and conditions upon which the royalty interests in the unit, or units, shall, in the absence of voluntary agreements, be deemed to be integrated without the necessity of a subsequent separate order integrating the royalty interests."

Since a function of the integration order can be to set the terms and conditions upon which royalty interests in the unit will be integrated, utilizing the minimum requirements of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act is an appropriate baseline for ensuring that an integration order includes terms and conditions that are just and reasonable.

Of the four statutes listed, the Oil and Gas Conservation Acts' definition of market value was included, because Idaho Code 47-332, subsection 4, which addresses reports to royalty owners, including deemed leased owners, requires that the gross production, disposition, and market value be stated on each oil and gas royalty check stub.

Also, Snake River Oil and Gas, as the lessee, would have to maintain all reports and records that any integrated owner, as the lessor, may require in order to verify gross production, disposition, and market value

Page 53
of oil and gas sold from the unit.
The first sentence of Idaho Code 47-310, subsection 11, defines market value as it applies to 47-332, subsection 4, which I just discussed.

In addition, the second sentence of the definition of market value is also applicable to the royalty check stubs, because 47-332(1)(i) requires that the royalty owners' share of severance taxes be stated on the check stub. In the definition of market value, the legislature has limited what, if any, deductions can minimize that severance tax.

So the "just and reasonable" terms of integration should include, at a minimum, applicable statutory requirements. So each statute that relates to the royalty interests of a deemed leased owner is relevant to the integration order and the contract's terms that would be imposed upon those owners.

Finally, Section C of IDL's brief identifies some contract-based considerations that you may want to identify as "just and reasonable" factors for further discussion and presentation at the evidentiary hearing.

The process of integration under the Oil and
23 Gas Conservation Act imposes binding contracts on deemed 24 leased owners. It is therefore incumbent upon the 25 applicants, and this tribunal, to ensure that those
contract terms at least comply with the statutory minimum requirements.

In turn, it is incumbent upon the applicants,
and this tribunal, to ensure that the imposed leased
terms do not give the operator more than the right to
develop, produce, and sell the oil and gas from the unit.

If the standard lease form, submitted as
Exhibit D, does not comply with Idaho law, the
integration order is the tool for altering those form contract's terms.

Therefore the considerations listed in Section C could be useful in enabling this tribunal to ensure that a final order granting the integration application imposed contract's terms on the deemed leased owners only to the extent permitted under Idaho law.

If you have any questions, I would be happy to address those for you.

HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Ms. Vega. One question that I pose: Would you share industry standards regarding factors used in setting "just and reasonable" terms? Again, Idaho, as everyone has said so far, is a new state to this. So a broader, I think, body of industry could help.

MS. VEGA: And I agree, Mr. Thomas, that Idaho

## Page 55

1 is a generally new state to oil and gas development. It 2 has existed for, I think, over a hundred years; however, 3 not to any great economic value. However, that could certainly change.

The focus of the Department's review or consideration of industry standards is really focused on ensuring that those standards conform to Idaho law. Although I was not personally involved with the drafting of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, my understanding,
from those who were, is that other nearby western developing states were looked to and their laws were looked to and their processes were looked to as to what works in our region.

So if this tribunal needs to go outside of the Idaho Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the applicable regulatory rules and administrative rules, you could look at what other states in our region are doing, based on what those states' laws are and whether or not they're very similar or very different from Idaho's.

You could also perhaps look at what the Bureau of Land Management does in standard lease. I believe it's standard across the country. However, there may be differences in regional lease forms.

But those are things, so kind of the standard 24 25 statutes that are used across most states; standard
lease forms are terms that are used by the federal government, or other state governments; are terms that are common in the industry, generally accepted in this industry; and the application across state governments and the federal government is a normal, understood thing in the industry which also probably benefits our courts and other sister jurisdictions.
8 HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Ms. Vega. That's all I have.

MS. VEGA: Thank you.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Folks, thanks a lot. I was going to ask again, are the Dorsings in attendance either virtually or in person?
(Pause given for response.)
(No response.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: On my Zoom portal, I don't see any unknown numbers. So I wanted to give them another opportunity.

I'd like now to ask, are there any other uncommitted mineral interest owners in the proposed unit that plan to participate today? In person, first, is anybody in the room?
(Pause given for response.)
(No response.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. In Zoom

Page 57
universe, is there anyone out there?
(Pause given for response.)
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I'm going to give you about 20 seconds to find the mute button. Ah.

MR. GOZZO: Mick, this is Chris. One thing I'd like to mention is that with the webinar format of Zoom, we've got three attendees joined, and by default, they are muted.

HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I'll go ahead and we'll start in the upper left. I just want to make sure everyone has the opportunity to at least say "I don't want to say anything," or talk.

So I have Nancy Bankhead. Chris, if you could un-mute her and see if she would like to make comment. And, Nancy, you don't have to say anything. If you're quiet, we'll just move on.

MR. GOZZO: Okay. I will ask Nancy to un-mute.

MR. LEADER-PICONE: This is Malcolm Leader-Picone. I'm attorney for Nancy Bankhead and Fallon Enterprises, Inc., the owner of the real property on which the Fallon 10 and Fallon 11 wells are located. And we're not going to be making a presentation or a statement today. We're just observing. If you have any questions of us, we're happy to answer questions.
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2 $\quad$ HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you Mr.

Page 59
in the room.
MR. BROWN: I'll say something.
3 HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Okay. We do have one 4 person.
5 (Unintelligible.)
6 HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Just call me hearing 7 officer --

MR. BROWN: Hearing Officer? Richard Brown 9 with Snake River. And I understand we're here to talk about "just and reasonable," and what would be discussed at -- so we're having a hearing to talk about "just and reasonable" to have another hearing. And I'm going to say that we, as the operator, are spending way too much 14 money on hearings. Right now we're spending ten times more money on legal fees than we're spending on buying oil and gas leases and drilling oil and gas wells and producing oil and gas.

So I would say that hopefully, at this next hearing, that we have now defined what "just and reasonable" is, that we can move forward and have less hearings, maybe condense the hearings going forward.

Mr. Piotrowski keeps referring to that IDL is

## mineral rights.

In this case, I think Malcolm -- Mr. -- Ms.

Bankhead's attorney was just on the phone. They are the largest owner in the unit, followed by Ms. Donohoe [phonetic\} -- excuse me, Ms. Lockner.

Next down to -- so we've got almost 90 percent
of the unit that want us to drill a well, and we're
prevented from doing so because we don't have an integration.

So the other thing is, you-all just had testimony, you-all are going to lean on other states and what they do, and why don't we lean on other states in this regard as well. So integration in other states occurs in some window of a 90 - to 120 -day period. In this case we've been at this -- we're going to be pushing up to over 12 months when this is done.

And there are not -- there's not multiple hearings in other states. There's typically -- so we've had spacing. We've got spacing. Now we're having a "just and reasonable" hearing. And then there's going to be an integration hearing. In other states, there's typically one hearing.

So if we're going to lean on other states, let's do it the way they do it.

And, anyway, that's all I have to say. Thank you.
25

And I understand "just and reasonable" to me, as a nonlawyer, means fair, or what would be inferred to what's fair. And I would question whether two acres in six forty, causing us to spend twelve months going through hearings on this, if that would be considered -although that's not involved in this integration, but if that's just and reasonable, and -- but this "just and reasonable" term comes about, and it's used in regard to integrations, and it's going to be -- we're going to talking about what's just and reasonable to have integration on this Fallon one eleven.

So this term "integration," and integration exists in almost all of oil and gas producing states in the United States. And the purposes of integration -two of the most important parts of integration are to -it has a feature that it gets parties together; in other words, a pending integration gets parties to the table to work out terms at an arm's-length transaction.

In the absence of that, we go -- operators go to integration. And we have in this case.

But another very important part of integration is it prohibits minorities from prohibiting majority
from exercising their rights, from enjoying their

Page 62
And I need to make sure that we all -- go ahead. I'm not going to ask you a question. That's fine.

I wanted to say that I procedurally kind of broke my own rules here. I would have liked for Snake River to offer rebuttal before the comments began.

I haven't forgotten about you-all, all right?
We'll get to it.
So let's go ahead and flow through the public comments and I'll say to Snake River, for your rebuttal, please don't consider any comments in your rebuttal.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Sure. I understand.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Brown.
Do we have any other commenters? I don't see anyone who hasn't been given the opportunity to speak yet. Anybody else in the room? Go ahead. State your name.

MR. HATFIELD: My name is Bob Hatfield.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Mr. Hatfield? Go ahead. I'll give you five minutes.

MR. HATFIELD: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
I just wanted to say that, you know, we have a small business here that we started here, and I've been affiliated with the oil and gas thing here since 2010.

And we've been on again, off again, on again,

Page 63
off again. And we get on the bandwagon. We drill some
2 wells, and produce some wells, and complete stuff, and 3 do workovers. And we get things all [unintelligible] up 4 and we start rolling ahead, and everybody's doing well, 5 and then all of a sudden something comes up and 6 everything shuts down. And then we're shut down for -7 and now we've been shut down -- we haven't really done a whole lot since they finished the Barlow at Fallon wells.

And so now we've been all these years without anything going on. We need to get an industry standard. We have to keep going and get some kind of momentum built so that we have enough wells that we can say this is an industry standard. Because this is not Wyoming. It's not California, North Dakota.

But, you know, we just -- we're really hanging on, trying to stay in business so that we can keep moving forward, you know.

And that's all I really want to say. My people would really like to come back home and work.
21 Because we're not providing, you know, low-income jobs.
22 We're providing jobs that are paying people three
23 hundred, four hundred, five hundred dollars a day. You
24 know, when things are going on here, we can do that.
25 But we can't do that unless this deal's up and running.

So we have to go other places to do it.
I have people working in Nevada, that are
working in Washington; they're working in North Dakota.
They live here. They're all people that live in this
community, and they want to come home.
So that's why we put all this together years ago, and then we get it up and then it all shuts down.

So that's pretty much all I have to say.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Hatfield.

MR. HATFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: I will say, before Snake River comes up with their rebuttal, if you want to make -- if you want to provide comments, I'm willing to accept comments up to probably, let's say, 5 o'clock Mountain Time tomorrow, if you want to e-mail comments directly in to me. I just really want to give the opportunity for everyone to speak.

I would say, I think, on our OGCC site definitely -- if there is, contact us. Just go to the OGCC.Idaho.gov, click on "contact," and we'll make sure your comments are recorded, again, up until 5 p.m. tomorrow, Mountain Time.

And with that, Snake River counsel, thank you for your patience. I invite you to come up and offer

Page 65
any rebuttal.
MR. CHRISTIAN: Thank you, Mister Administrator. I'll try to be brief.

Mr. Piotrowski, in his comments, referred repeatedly to, or described the process repeatedly, as a taking of uncommitted mineral owners' interests and a forced sale of those interests to others. And as a legal matter, I think that's incorrect. There's a number of courts, over a long period of time, who have said that the integration is not a taking. In fact, Mr. Piotrowski's clients in the CAIA vs. Schultz case initially asserted a taking claim and then ultimately dropped it in the case, I think because it recognized that it wasn't an appropriate claim. It is not a compensable taking.

The courts have recognized that the integration or pooling process is a regulation of that interest in a valid exercise of the State's police power, which is the whole balancing act. So it's sort of maybe a small issue but I think it's important to keep in mind that what is being -- what is happening is the regulation of their interests.

Mr. Piotrowski continued his discussion, which carried over into his briefing, or from his briefing, about implied elements of the statute, what should be

1 implied from the statute. And of course he implied a 2 broad range of things, up to and including an entirely 3 separate procedure and notice and subpoena power and 4 every other -- other things that don't exist in the statute.

And my response is really just, to the extent that there are things that are directly contrary to what is set forth in the statute, by definition it can't be necessarily implied from the statute.

If 47-328 says, here is the procedure upon which we will process applications for integration, and the timeframes under which it will occur, and who may participate, and whether there may be discovery, and all of those things; those are set in statute. That's the procedure. And you cannot imply, from the statute, some other procedure which is well in excess and contrary to that.

And he stated in his comments about whether, you know, everything else [unintelligible] is on the table, the entire universe is on the table. Again, you've got to keep in mind, and I think we all have to keep in mind, what did Judge Winmill say; what was his directive, what was the requirement of the federal court to do to comport with due process; that is, what factors are you going to consider.

## Page 67

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He recognized that the meaning of that term -because it's not -- there's no definition of it in the statute -- is an item of discretion for the agency; in this case for you, or if it's appealed, to the Commission. And there is abundant case law in our own state courts about what constitutes an appropriate exercise of discretion. I'm getting old, and I may forget [unintelligible] but for a court to exercise its discretion, for example, they've got to recognize that it is an element of discretion; they have to engage in something that's not completely arbitrary in the manner in which they exercise it, and follow through those steps, and you have properly exercised your discretion.

It is no different here, which, I think, is why Judge Winmill did not go off into any sort of investigation or finding or order regarding what "just and reasonable" means, because he recognized that's not for me to say. That's an element of -- an item of discretion for you, the Administrator, or the Commission ultimately.

And so as long as you follow the rules on the exercise of discretion, and you do this extra piece that

So, again, I'm repeating myself, but we need

1 to keep in mind, what is it exactly that Judge Winmill said, and what does the statute say about what the Commission does and what its ultimate goal is, what its ultimate purpose is.

Mr. Piotrowski engaged in a discussion of correlative rights which he said included, you know -he thinks it includes, or suggested it includes, the right not to sell, and some other things. And again, the statute defines what correlative rights means.

In making your decision, and the Commission doing its job, it has to operate under the statutory definition that has been provided to it by the legislature. Because again, the Commission is a preacher of statute and it has the power that the legislature gave it and no more.

And so it must use that definition. And so if its job is to protect correlative rights, that means engage in processes and do those things that it can do, within the statutory framework, to ensure that all interest holders have the opportunity to receive their equitable share of production. Because that's the definition of correlative rights. And don't commit waste. And that also is defined in the statute.

I think that's all I have to say about the opposing mineral owners' comments.

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With respect to Ms. Vega's comments on behalf of the Department, I am not sure but I think we are actually now on the same page about the scope of application of that definition of market value in Section 310, sub 11. I think what she said -- and she'll correct me if I'm wrong -- was that it applies to that definition, or to those reporting obligations in

And so to the extent there are reporting obligations to royalty interest holders, which the integrated mineral owners will be, how that reporting occurs is impacted by the definition of market value. I don't think I disagree with that.

I started with the assumption that the Department was urging that market value meant something in all -- in all settings, and that, for example, which results in the particular lease term. And I think she maybe corrected my misapprehension.

The only other comment I would have about the Department's suggestions are, yes, it is reasonable to say that we should ensure that the operator complies with the law. The question is whether -- whether an integration order has to proactively include terms which seek to enforce portions of the law which are already there and that the operator is already subject to. The

| Page 70 |  |
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| operator already has to do things. It has to submit an <br> application for a permit to drill, for example, or if it <br> wants to plug a well, it has to follow certain standards <br> that are set forth in the statute. <br> If it wants to -- you know, its casing has to <br> meet certain standards, and cementing, and it has to <br> report in certain ways. <br> It isn't necessary to recite all of those <br> things in the integration order. It's appropriate to <br> say, you know, do I, as the Administrator, when I look <br> at the application, do I see anything that is possibly <br> contrary to what their obligation is under the law. <br> I think it's a -- it's a very large and <br> unwieldy and maybe impossible job for an operator to <br> say, in the universe of laws that could apply to my <br> application and I'm going to show you how this <br> application applies to every single one of them. That <br> could go on for weeks, I think, in a research project. <br> So I think it's -- I think that approach isn't <br> necessary. But certainly if either the Department, in <br> evaluating the application, or an opposing mineral owner <br> has some suggestion that something that's included in an <br> application is out of [unintelligible] of the statute or <br> the rules, then certainly the operator ought to be <br> prepared to respond to that. <br> But the intention of any operator, I think, <br> that's supplying an application for integration is what we've described, which is, what are the economic terms <br> upon which we're going to deal with uncommitted mineral <br> interests, with the knowledge that everything else we do <br> in our operation we're subject to the law and have to comply with it, otherwise we're subject to penalties and enforcement from the Department and the Commission. <br> I think those are all the comments I have. <br> HEARING OFFICER THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. <br> Christian. And again -- well, to everyone, virtually <br> and in the room, thank you for participating. I will <br> take this matter under advisement and issue a written <br> description -- decision within 30 calendar days of this hearing. <br> That adjourns our hearing. Thank you very much. <br> Chris, you can stop recording. <br> (End of audio recording.) | REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE <br> I, EMILY L. NORD, CSR NO. 695, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Certify: <br> That the audio recording of the proceedings were transcribed by me or under my direction; That the foregoing is a true and correct transcription of the audio recording, to the best of my ability; <br> I further certify that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or party, nor am I financially interested in the action. <br> in witness whereof, I set my hand and seal this 2nd day of June, 2021. <br> EMILY L. NORD, CSR, RPR <br> Notary Public <br> P.O. Box 2636 <br> Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 <br> My Commission Expires November 5, 2023 |


| \$ | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { Acts' (1) } \\ 52: 16 \\ \text { Act's (1) } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { against (3) } \\ & 30: 22 ; 40: 18 ; 44: 4 \\ & \text { agency (1) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 23:2;26:23;38:17 } \\ \text { apologize }(\mathbf{2}) \\ \text { 9:6;30:6 } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| \$100 (1) | 26: |  | apparently (2) |
| 41:10 | actual (3) | aggressively (1) | 16:8;47:6 |
| [ | 25:21;48:4;51:12 | 42:8 | appealed |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { actually (3) } \\ & 34: 15 ; 42: 23 ; 69: 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ago (2) } \\ & 9: 24 ; 64: 7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 29:3;67:4 } \\ \text { appearing (3) } \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  |  |  |
| [inaudible] (1) | $$ | agree (2)$33: 18 ; 54: 2$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7: 19,20 ; 49: 11 \\ & \text { appears (1) } \end{aligned}$ |
| $15: 13$ |  |  |  |
| [phonetic\} (1) | additional (2) | agreed (1) | 10:22applicable (5) |
| 61:3 | 5:6;10:12 | 28:8 |  |
| [unintelligible] (18) 9:24;11:11;14:22;17:1; | Additionally (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 17:15;23:16;24:11,14 } \\ & \text { agreements (2) } \end{aligned}$ | $49: 16 ; 50: 8 ; 53: 6,13 ; 55: 15$ |
| 20:11,21;21:1,17;25:24;32:25; | $\begin{aligned} & 50: 4 \\ & \text { address (14) } \\ & 6: 16 ; 17: 25 ; 22: 18 ; 26: 8 \\ & 30: 19 ; 33: 21 ; 35: 25 ; 37: 22 \\ & 39: 17 ; 40: 6 ; 45: 17 ; 46: 17 ; 47: 8 \\ & 54: 18 \\ & \text { addressed (5) } \end{aligned}$ |  | 7:10;51:14 |
| $35: 8 ; 36: 15 ; 40: 25 ; 41: 1 ; 63: 3 ;$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { agreements (2) } \\ 15: 23 ; 52: 5 \end{gathered}$ |  |
| 66:19;67:8;70:23 |  | agriculture (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 8:23;49:24;53:25;54:3 } \\ & \text { applicant's (1) } \end{aligned}$ |
| A |  | Ah (1) | 51:21 |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 57:4 } \\ \text { ahead (11) } \end{gathered}$ | application (23) |
| AAPL (1) | $37: 20 ; 38: 22,23,24 ; 51: 2$ |  | 32:24;33:2;47:6;49:23;51:6,7; |
| 24:17 | addresses (2) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 8:19;19:11;30:14;33:17; } \\ & \text { 57:9;58:7;62:1,8,16,20;63:4 } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| abandoned (1) 11:8 | 50:24;52:18 | 57:9;58:7;62:1,8,16,20;63:4 | 54:14;56:4;69:4;70:2,11,16,17, $21,23 ; 71: 2$ |
| ability (3) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 6:6,7;20:13;31:18;36:14 } \\ & \text { adequate (5) } \end{aligned}$ | 48:18 | applications (2) |
| 10:17;41:17;42:8 |  | alleged (1) | 27:15;66:11 |
| able (2) | 37:19;38:4,14;39:22;42:6adjourns (1) | 47:15 | applied (2) |
| 12:13;45:10 |  | all-encompassing (1) | 34:2;39:9 |
| absence (2) | adjourns (1) $71: 16$ | 12:8 | 53:3;69:6;70:17 |
| 52:4;60:19 | administer (2) | Alliance (1) |  |
| abundant (1) | 14:15;50:12 | $30: 1$ | apply (2) |
| $67: 5$ accept (4) | 15:2 | 25:13 | appreciate (1) |
| accept 7:13, (4); | administrative (5) | allowed (2) $6 \cdot 11 \cdot 20 \cdot 19$ | 41:13 |
| acceptable (1) | 10:3;14:2;36:19;49:16;55:16 | 6:11;20:19 | approach (4) |
| 38:14 | Administrator (7) | almost (4) | 32:18,19,20;70:19 |
| accepted (3) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 4:23;8:21;12:5;34:23;65:3; } \\ & 67: 19 ; 70: 10 \end{aligned}$ | 31:13;47:21;60:13;61:4 | appropriate (6) |
| 23:17;50:5;56:3 |  | Alta (3)$24: 13 ; 33: 5 ; 47: 17$ | 45:20;48:12;52:12;65:14; |
| accomplished (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 67:19;70:10 } \\ & \text { admitted (2) } \end{aligned}$ |  | approve (1) |
| $12: 17$ account (1) | advantageous (1) | 54:10 | 44:4 |
| account (1) |  |  | April (1) |
| accountability (2) | 24:6 | although (7) $4 \cdot 7 \cdot 14 \cdot 20 \cdot 30 \cdot 18 \cdot 33 \cdot 14 \cdot 34 \cdot 7$. |  |
| 19:20;30:1 | 71:13 | $\begin{aligned} & 4: 7 ; 14: 20 ; 30: 18 ; 33: 14 ; 34: 7 \text {; } \\ & 55: 8 ; 60: 6 \end{aligned}$ | arbitrary (1) |
| acre (1) | $\operatorname{affect~(1)~}$$10: 16$ | always (3) | 67:11 |
| 59:25 |  | 37:10;39:23;43:1 | $15: 22 ; 23: 24 ; 24: 5,16 ; 27: 12$ |
| acreage (2) | $\begin{gathered} 10: 16 \\ \text { affected (1) } \end{gathered}$ | 37:12;41:15 |  |
| 24:5,7 | $46: 10$ affidavits (1) |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { areas (2) } \\ 23: 17 ; 28: 12 \end{array}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { acres (3) } \\ & 46: 7 ; 59: 25 ; 60: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 6:12affiliated (1) | $24: 17 ; 30: 25 ; 37: 24 ; 42: 4$ | argue (1) <br> 18:19 |
| across (8) |  |  |  |
| 23:21;24:15,19;25:14;26:22; | $\begin{gathered} 62: 24 \\ \text { affiliates (1) } \end{gathered}$ | $10: 12,14 ; 11: 22 ; 12: 1$ <br> analogous (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \operatorname{argument}(12) \\ & \quad 6: 14,14 ; 7: 11,13,16 ; 11: 4 ; \end{aligned}$ |
| 55:22,25;56:4 |  |  |  |
| Act (33) | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { 47:18 } \\ \text { afternoon (1) } \end{array}$ | $21: 19$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19: 23 ; 26: 24 ; 28: 2 ; 36: 19,23 \\ & 43: 15 \end{aligned}$ |
| 9:13;12:6,18,21;13:15,19; $14: 7,10,11,16,17,21 \cdot 15: 6,8$ |  | 23:19 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { arguments (5) } \\ 5: 10 ; 7: 10 ; 9: 3 ; 18: 23 ; 37: 22 \end{array}$ |
| 14:7,10,11,16,17,21;15:6,8; | $58: 10$ Afterward (1) |  |  |
| 21:7,12;26:24;27:1,2;50:13; | $\begin{gathered} 7: 12 \\ \text { again (22) } \end{gathered}$ | 40:16 | Arkansas (3)$21: 18 ; 22: 7 ; 23: 15$ |
| 52:11;53:23;55:9,15;65:19 |  | $5: 22$ |  |
| actively (1) | $\begin{aligned} & 7: 3 ; 12: 4 ; 18: 18 ; 19: 4,5,9 \\ & 26: 13 ; 31: 9 ; 38: 18 ; 54: 22 ; 56: 12 ; \\ & 58: 22 ; 62: 25,25,25 ; 63: 1 ; 64: 22 \\ & 66: 20 ; 67: 25 ; 68: 8,13 ; 71: 11 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\operatorname{arm}(1)$$14: 2$ |
| 42:8 |  | ```Anglo-American (1) 37:10 answered (3)``` |  |
| activities (1) |  |  | arm's-length (1) |
| 51:8 |  |  | 60:18 |

arrangements (1) 5:6
aside (1) 19:16
aspects (1) 5:12
asserted (1) 65:12
assertions (1) 18:20
Association (1) 24:18
assume (1) 38:6
assumed (3) 34:18,19;36:6
assuming (1) 29:1
assumption (5) 34:25;35:2,4,5;69:14
assure (1) 39:5
assuring (1) 39:8
attendance (3) 22:19;49:1;56:12
attendees (1) 57:7
attorney (5) 8:22;49:10,11;57:20;61:1
audience (3) 22:17;23:9;30:7
Audio (2) 8:8;71:19
August (1) 9:16
authority (6)

```
        12:7;14:5,7;26:5;36:18;
```

        50:11
    authorize (2) 13:3;16:18
authorized (1) 14:12
avenues (1) 17:20
avoid (1) 19:19
avoidance (1) 37:12
aware (2) 9:10;11:14
away (2) 19:15;45:10
awful (2) 19:18;42:3

| B | Bob (1) |
| :---: | :---: |
| $62: 18$ |  |
| body (1) |  |
| $54: 24$ |  |
| back (7) | Boise (1) |
| $22: 14 ; 30: 8 ; 32: 2 ; 38: 18 ;$ | $4: 21$ |
| $44: 15 ; 46: 17 ; 63: 20$ | bonus (9) |
| background (1) | $11: 17 ; 22: 5 ; 24: 2 ; 35: 21,23 ;$ |
| $30: 22$ |  |

41:10,12,19;42:18
booked (1) 5:5
Both (6)
21:18;33:16;36:9;40:14;
44:11;45:25
boxes (1) 4:6
break (2) 39:12;46:15
Bridge (1) 24:12
brief (18)
18:13;19:18;20:6;21:6; 22:15;23:3,7;26:3;30:10;33:20; 36:11;49:14,15;50:17,24; 51:23;53:18;65:3
briefing (16)
6:11;9:1,23;11:4,6,12;13:14, 18;14:1;16:6;18:3;21:16;22:9; 27:5;65:24,24
briefly (1) 33:22
briefs (2) 5:8;33:13
bring (2) 9:2;34:7
bringing (1) 17:3
broad (5) 23:12,24;38:7;39:13;66:2
broadcast (1) 5:24
broader (1) 54:23
broadly (2) 24:25;47:7
broke (1) 62:4
BROWN (5) 59:2,8,8;61:25;62:13
built (1) 63:13
Bureau (1) 55:20
business (2) 62:23;63:17
button (1)
57:4
buy (1) 44:19
buying (2) 24:5;59:15

| $\mathbf{C}$ |
| :---: |

CAIA (9) 9:14;10:1;19:8;37:7;38:2,5; 46:20;59:24;65:11
CAIA's (1) 18:3
calendar (1) 71:14

California (1)
63:15
call (9)
5:3;23:20,21;29:15;33:13,18; 36:12;49:5;59:6
called (3)
5:18;37:11;39:15
calls (1) 17:4
came (1) 48:1
can (39) 5:4;7:5;8:7,7;16:17;17:12,14, 16,22;20:5;21:11;23:22;24:24; 27:18;29:16,18,23;30:7,13; 31:14;33:17;37:14;38:16;39:5, 12;41:7;44:15;47:8;48:18;49:2, 2;52:8;53:10;59:20;63:13,17, 24;68:18;71:18
carried (1) 65:24
carry (1) 14:9
case (34) 9:14,16;10:11;13:23;14:1; 17:11,15;19:9;20:7,19;21:20; 26:6;31:4;32:7;37:12,13,14,17, 20,23;38:12,16;41:4;45:15,23; 46:8,8;60:20,25;61:13;65:11, 13;67:4,5
case-by-case (1) 32:18
cases (6) 21:5;32:8;39:10,16;41:11; 42:15
casing (2) 16:22;70:5
categories (3) 33:23;39:13,14
category (2) 33:18;42:12
cause (1) 17:4
causing (1) 60:4
CC-2021-OGR-01-001 (1) 6:3
cementing (1) 70:6
certain (7)
7:1,1;27:12;51:21;70:3,6,7
certainly (9) 29:18,23;32:20;35:2;36:19; 41:12;55:4;70:20,24
chairs (1) 49:3
challenge (3) 16:10;31:11;32:15
challenges (2) 31:1;38:25
change (3) 10:6;19:9;55:4
changed (1)

| 5:12 | collection (1) | 66:24;67:23 | contextual (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| chapter (2) | 19:3 | concerned (2) | 45:21;47:14 |
| 15:3;51:24 | combination (1) | 13:19;26:13 | continually (1) |
| characterization (1) | 43:18 | concluded (1) | 47:5 |
| 19:16 | coming (2) | 37:17 | continue (3) |
| chargeable (1) | 4:5;38:18 | condense (1) | 5:7;28:12;32:6 |
| 20:17 | comment (10) | 59:21 | continued (1) |
| charging (1) | 5:9;8:24;21:11;26:25;27:14, | condition (2) | 65:23 |
| 20:21 | 17;57:14;58:8,21;69:19 | 15:19;21:1 | continues (1) |
| check (4) | commenters (1) | conditions (9) | 5:21 |
| 4:6;52:21;53:7,9 | 62:14 | 4:16;9:20;10:20;17:2;19:3; | contract (2) |
| choice (1) | comments (17) | 26:4;52:3,9,13 | 47:4;54:1 |
| 32:21 | 5:8;7:17,17,18,19;62:5,9,10; | conduct (2) | contract-based (3) |
| choose (1) | 64:14,15,16,22;65:4;66:18; | 33:5,5 | 49:17;50:16;53:19 |
| 46:9 | 68:25;69:1;71:9 | conducting (1) | contracts (2) |
| choosing (1) | commerce (1) | 4:24 | 12:10;53:23 |
| 11:23 | 20:17 | conducts (1) | contract's (3) |
| chose (2) | Commission (28) | 27:3 | 53:16;54:11,15 |
| 33:2,2 | 9:23;10:14,24;11:5,21;12:8; | conference (2) | contrary (6) |
| chosen (6) | 13:22;14:3,4,12;15:4;17:23; | 8:10;58:17 | 18:6,17;19:5;66:7,16;70:12 |
| $31: 12,14 ; 32: 16,17 ; 33: 9 ; 42: 5$ | 19:13;20:8,20,25;32:17,22; | conflict (1) | copy (1) |
| Chris (6) | 34:22,25;50:9,15;67:5,19;68:3, | 14:17 | 22:2 |
| 8:5;48:17;57:5,13;58:7; | 10,13;71:8 | conform (1) | corporate (1) |
| 71:18 | Commission's (6) | 55:7 | 44:21 |
| Christian (28) | 10:18;12:7,19;14:22;15:13; | Conservation (10) | corrected (1) |
| 8:3,14,16,20,22;22:13;23:1, | $21: 24$ | $9: 13 ; 12: 6 ; 32: 17 ; 50: 9,13$ | $69: 18$ |
| 12;25:10;26:10;28:5;29:11,13; | commit (1) | 52:11,16;53:23;55:9,15 | correlative (15) |
| 30:15;31:6;33:20;34:6;38:3,10; | 68:22 | consider (4) | 13:6,14;14:15,23;15:2;20:13; |
| 41:11;45:18;47:4,16;48:14; | common (1) | 4:15;25:5;62:10;66:25 | 26:14;39:18;40:9,16;43:18; |
| 49:4;62:11;65:2;71:11 | 56 | consideration (7) | 68:6,9,17,22 |
| 31:20 | 64:5 | 20:25;26:11;27:18,20;29 43:17;55:6 | costs (3) 10:4;44:22;45:8 |
| citations (1) | companies (1) | considerations (5) | counsel (2) |
| 21:5 | 41:2 | 26:21;49:17;50:17;53:19; | 49:6;64:24 |
| cite (3) | company (2) | 54:12 | country (2) |
| 20:7,16;38:12 | 47:17;48:1 | considered (11) | 24:19;55:22 |
| cited (3) | compare (1) | 9:11,19;10:19;11:1;17:9; | County (1) |
| 14:1;20:9;21:4 | 28:6 | 19:12;30:21;32:21;46:5;49:21; | 4:21 |
| Citizens (1) | comparison (2) | 60:5 | couple (6) |
| 30:1 | 15:21;29:8 | consisted (1) | 11:24;21:17;23:13;36:14; |
| City (1) | compensable (1) | 46:7 | 46:17;50:24 |
| 4:12 | 65:15 | consistency (1) | course (4) |
| claim (3) | compensation (1) | 13:1 | 14:2;16:13;43:2;66:1 |
| 41:25;65:12,14 | 19:19 | consistent (1) | court (14) |
| clarify (1) | complaint (1) | 22:6 | 9:15;13:23;20:7,9,23;31:20; |
| 7:3 | 17:22 | consisting (1) | 34:22;37:7,21;38:12;42:4; |
| clarifying (1) | complete (2) | 4:18 | 66:23;67:8,23 |
| 7:24 | 7:16;63:2 | constitutes (2) | courtesy (1) |
| clear (4) | completely (3) | 34:14;67:6 | 46:15 |
| 14:21,21;31:19;34:16 | 19:7,24;67:11 | constitution (1) | courts (9) |
| clearly (4) | completion (1) | 38:20 | 32:3;33:25;35:12;37:10,24; |
| 5:19;34:13,24;35:15 | 16:23 | constitutional (15) | 56:6;65:9,16;67:6 |
| click (2) | compliance (2) | 20:12,22;31:2,22;32:1;33:15; | cover (1) |
| 5:25;64:21 | 35:1;49:25 | 34:2;36:13,24;37:1,11;38:13, | 51:7 |
| clients (4) | complies (2) | 25;43:11,17 | covered (1) |
| 32:7,7;46:11;65:11 | 9:17;69:21 | construction (1) | 27:1 |
| close (2) | comply (3) | 15:14 | covering (1) |
| 10:11;19:9 | 54:1,9;71:7 | contact (2) | 15:14 |
| closely (1) | complying (2) | 64:20,21 | covers (2) |
| 42:11 | 35:6,16 | contemplates (1) | 15:6;58:18 |
| Code (7) | component (1) | 17:6 | COVID-19 (1) |
| 4:17,25;49:16;50:3;52:1,17; | 5:14 | context (2) | 5:11 |
| 53:2 | comport (2) | 32:4;35:11 | created (1) |


| 13:22 | 53:3;68:9 | 25:4;36:2;44:11 | Division (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| critical (1) | definitely (1) | determining (8) | 4:23;49:12 |
| 41:6 | 64:20 | 4:15;9:11,19;10:20;11:1; | Docket (3) |
| cross (1) | definition (11) | 30:21;34:20;40:8 | 4:10;6:2;50:22 |
| 25:7 | 52:16;53:6,9;66:8;67:2; | develop (2) | doctrine (1) |
| cross-examine (1) | 68:12,16,22;69:4,7,12 | 20:1;54:6 | 37:11 |
| 42:9 | delay (1) | developed (3) | documents (1) |
| crossing (1) | 33:3 | 35:7;39:15;47:20 | 6:2 |
| 25:19 | delegated (1) | developing (2) | dollars (2) |
| current (1) | 50:10 | 47:3;55:11 | 24:8;63:23 |
| 33:7 | delegation (1) | development (3) | done (8) |
| currently (1) | 50:14 | 12:23;13:4;55:1 | 16:15;32:13;40:24;43:12; |
| 32:8 | demonstrated (1) | device (1) | 45:12;61:14;63:7;67:24 |
| D | $38: 9$ denied (1) | 5:16 | Donohoe (1) |
| D | $40: 24$ | 17:18 | door (1) |
| Dakota (3) | Department (21) | differences (1) | 22:14 |
| 47:11;63:15;64:3 | 7:13;9:5;10:25;12:5;14:2; | 55:23 | Dorsings (4) |
| date (1) | 19:2,13;21:22;27:18;44:10; | different (12) | 6:17,19;22:19;56:12 |
| 6:10 | 49:6,12,13;50:11,23;51:11; | 12:12;17:2,2;27:8;32:4; | doubt (1) |
| day (1) | 52:2;69:2,15;70:20;71:8 | 41:19;46:8;47:9,11,13;55:19; | 35:4 |
| 63:23 | Department's (4) | 67:14 | down (8) |
| days (1) | 27:16;51:23;55:5;69:20 | differing (1) | 25:20;33:13;39:12;61:4; |
| 71:14 | depend (1) | 16:25 | 63:6,6,7;64:7 |
| deadline (1) | 45:21 | difficult (3) | drafting (1) |
| 7:4 | dependent (1) | 30:4,17;48:11 | 55:8 |
| deal (5) | 28:20 | difficulties (1) | draw (1) |
| 39:7;40:19;45:7,9;71:4 | depending (1) | 33:4 | 23:22 |
| deal's (1) | 5:1 | directed (1) | drill (6) |
| 63:25 | depends (1) | 21:16 | 16:21;45:3;48:6;61:5;63:1; |
| dealt (1) | 25:11 | directionally (1) | $70: 2$ |
| 16:20 | deprivation (2) | 25:19 | drilled (1) |
| decide (5) | 39:23;43:14 | directive (2) | 25:19 |
| 10:15;36:16;37:12,13;45:23 | deputy (1) | 9:15;66:23 | drilling (11) |
| decided (2) | 49:10 | directly (5) | $12: 16 ; 15: 7,14 ; 16: 11,18,20,$ |
| 37:8;39:6 | derive (1) | 9:23;19:5;44:15;64:17;66:7 | $22 ; 28: 22 ; 51: 8,16 ; 59: 16$ |
| deciding (3) | 24:24 | directs (1) | drink (1) |
| 12:3;34:1;38:19 | derived (1) | 14:17 | 48:19 |
| decision (13) | 24:17 | disagree (1) | dropped (1) |
| $9: 14,16 ; 10: 2,10 ; 19: 8 ; 20: 9,$ | describe (2) | $69: 13$ | $65: 13$ |
| 16;21:8;32:10,18;37:7;68:10; | 10:25;11:19 | disclosing (1) | due (17) |
| 71:14 | described (5) | 41:13 | $9: 18 ; 10: 12 ; 18: 23 ; 19: 10$ |
| decisions (1) | $10: 11 ; 13: 14,18 ; 65: 5 ; 71: 3$ | disconnected (1) | $20: 25 ; 33: 16 ; 37: 18,22 ; 38: 7,15$ |
| 12:10 | description (1) | 5:22 | 39:13;43:8,13,15,22;66:24; |
| declaration (1) | 71:14 | discovery (1) | 67:23 |
| 50:14 | designate (1) | 66:13 | duties (1) |
| decline (3) | 16:19 | discretion (16) | 50:10 |
| 39:20;42:14,15 | desire (1) | 10:14,19;11:2,22;19:13,15; | duty (1) |
| deductions (1) | 20:1 | 34:19;35:1,25;67:3,7,9,10,13, | 14:12 |
| 53:10 | despite (3) | $19,22$ |  |
| deemed (5) | 32:1;38:10;42:14 | discuss (1) | E |
| 52:5,18;53:15,23;54:15 | $\begin{gathered} \text { destroy (1) } \\ 43: 4 \end{gathered}$ | $9: 11$ |  |
| $17: 12$ | 43:4 detail (1) | discussed (2) $53: 4 ; 59: 10$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { earlier (2) } \\ \text { 21:23;26:25 } \end{array}$ |
| default (1) | 27:5 | discussion (6) | easier (1) |
| 57:7 | details (1) | 9:2;19:22;34:3;53:21;65:23; | 43:13 |
| Defendants (2) | 16:20 | 68:5 | easy (2) |
| 10:4,7 | determination (2) | disposition (2) | 44:1;49:15 |
| define (1) | 10:8;36:21 | 52:20,25 | economic (17) |
| 37:17 | determinations (1) | District (1) | $11: 16 ; 12: 10 ; 13: 9 ; 26: 8,11 ;$ |
| defined (4) | 35:12 | 34:22 | 28:3,4;42:22,23;43:1,5,8,9,12, |
| 13:15,19;59:19;68:23 | determine (10) | disturbance (2) | 16;55:3;71:3 |
| defines (2) | 4:14;6:6,13,24,25;10:7,19; | $5: 20,21$ | economically (1) |

15:21
effect (2)
36:3;37:5
effectively (4)
17:1;22:5;24:13,21
effort (1)
31:6
eighth (2) 24:2,9
either (6)
24:24;26:24;28:21;38:25;
56:13;70:20
elect (1) 17:14
element (4) 16:7,10;67:10,18
elements (3) 12:17;24:23;65:25
eleven (1) 60:11
eliminate (1) 4:7
else (11) 8:9;22:8;31:16;38:7;40:3; 42:18;44:5;45:8;62:16;66:19; 71:5
else's (1) 33:4
elsewhere (1) 39:1
e-mail (1) 64:16
emphasize (1) 11:24
enable (1) 50:1
enabling (1) 54:13
encourage (4)
12:11,22;14:22;34:10
end (8) 8:17;13:8,10;17:4;18:12; 43:25;44:9;71:19
enforce (5) 14:6,8,15;50:12;69:24
enforcement (1) 71:8
engage (5) 16:9;27:11;44:2;67:10;68:18
engaged (2) 11:6;68:5
engaging (1) 19:2
enjoy (1) 13:12
enjoying (1) 60:23
enormous (1) 31:1
enough (3) 9:7;22:9;63:13
ensure (6) 39:21;53:25;54:4,13;68:19;

69:21 $\quad$ exact (1)
ensuring (5)
12:12,15;43:22;52:12;55:7
enter (1) 39:25
entered (3) 29:2;47:7,17
Enterprises (2) 57:21;58:5
entire (2) 18:25;66:20
entirely (1) 66:2
environment (1) 31:10
equal (2) 5:9;17:16
equipping (1) 16:11
equitable (4)
12:13;13:17;26:17;68:21
escape (1) 31:25
essential (1) 11:16
essentially (2) 18:24;20:23
establish (1) 48:2
established (3) 47:25;50:6,21
establishing (1) 49:18
estate (4) 43:1,3,4,5
estates (1) 45:19
evaluate (1) 15:18
evaluated (1) 36:2
evaluating (1) 70:21
even (5) 18:19,25;34:18;41:22;44:19
event (2) 14:17;50:19
eventually (1) 11:8
everybody (6) 5:4;43:21;45:9,12;46:10; 58:16
everybody's (1) 63:4
everyone (11)
5:1,7;7:21;41:16;46:24; 48:18;49:2;54:22;57:11;64:18; 71:11
evidence (5) 7:7;10:18;49:20;50:4;51:17
evidentiary (8) 6:9;7:6,8;49:21,22,24;51:10; 53:21

exactly (2) 36:22;68:1
example (17)
17:23;23:13,25;24:21;25:12,
16,24;27:10;28:23;29:3;41:7; 42:22;51:7,14;67:9;69:16;70:2
examples (1) 21:17
exceeds (1) 15:19
Excellent (1) 8:13
except (1) 33:10
excess (1) 66:16
exclude (1) 10:17
excluded (1) 43:16
excuse (4) 20:12;49:19;50:25;61:3
exercise (9)
11:2;19:12;35:1;44:6;65:18;
67:7,8,12,22
exercised (2)
11:23;67:13
exercising (1) 60:23
Exhibit (3) 51:6,22;54:9
exist (3) 38:17;39:2;66:4
existed (1) 55:2
existence (1) 46:4
existing (4) 12:18;17:20;31:2;35:6
exists (2) 20:3;60:13
expansion (1) 18:16
expected (1) 51:18
experience (1) 48:6
expert (1) 36:6
experts (1) 19:2
explaining (1) 9:18
explicit (1) 38:1
explicitly (1) 9:25
exploration (1) 14:13
express (2)
34:4,11
expressed (4)
20:1;33:15;39:14;50:13
expressly (1)
34:21
extended (1)
12:1
extension (1) 29:2
extensive (1) 10:13
extent (5) 26:23;39:15;54:16;66:6;69:9
extra (1) 67:22
extraordinary (1) 11:25
extremely (1) 38:5
F
face (2)

$$
31: 10 ; 45: 22
$$

Facebook (2) 5:24;6:1
facilities (1)
19:4
facing (1) 41:8
fact (14) 6:8;7:2;10:1;21:23;30:25; 33:1;34:10;36:22;37:5;38:9; 41:24;43:9,11;65:10
fact-dependent (1) 26:1
factor (2) 18:18;36:1
factors (55) 4:14;6:6,12,25;9:11,18;10:7, 25;11:5,20;17:9;19:6,12;21:9, 11;23:8;25:4;28:2;29:7;30:20; 33:11,14,15,15,17,18;34:19,20; 35:9,13,17,18;36:8,9,9,10,13; 38:4,14;42:21,21;44:9,10;46:4, 9,25;49:19,20;50:5,18,25; 51:25;53:20;54:21;66:24
facts (4) 10:5,19;42:5;45:21
factual (1) 18:20
factually (1) 19:21
failure (1) 37:17
fair (4) 26:16;43:23;60:2,3
fairly (2) 34:7;43:25
fairness (1) 45:6
Fallon (6) 57:21,22,22;58:5;60:11;63:8 far (7)

11:3;12:3;17:3;21:21;34:11; 38:16;54:23
fast (1) 41:3
fault (7)
30:17,18,24,24;32:24,25;
38:15
feature (1) 60:16
federal (9) 9:15;20:8,20;34:22;38:12; 56:1,5;66:23;67:23
feedback (1) 8:5
feel (1) 58:21
fees (1) 59:15
feet (2) 25:20,25
few (6) 10:3;22:16;23:1;25:3;31:12; 46:14
figure (2) 33:11;35:10
file (3)
17:22;33:2;49:13
filed (2) 11:9;27:15
fill (1) 49:2
final (4) 29:5;42:12;50:19;54:14
finally (5) 30:25;33:25;39:21;44:13; 53:18
financial (1) 10:3
find (5) 37:3;43:20;44:13;48:10;57:4
finding (2) 42:10;67:16
fine (2) 58:14;62:2
finished (1) 63:8
first (20) 7:10,18;8:3;11:25;12:20; 15:6;17:13;23:2;34:8,12;36:15; 38:19;40:8,23;44:24;46:18,19; 53:2;56:21;58:20
fitted (1) 21:11
five (5) 5:3;7:17;58:22;62:20;63:23
fix (1) 37:20
flow (1) 62:8
focus (7) 6:24;9:1,2;14:21,22;34:8; 55:5
focused (1)

55:6
Folks (6)
4:5;27:16;40:12;48:24; 56:11;58:18
follow (4) 27:2;67:12,21;70:3
followed (2) 7:11;61:2
following (1) 26:19
follows (1) 7:9
follow-up (1) 27:25
footing (1) 17:16
force (3) 31:15;42:24;43:6
forced (6) 20:10,14;32:19;42:14;45:10; 65:7
forcing (2) 43:2;59:23
forget (1) 67:8
forgotten (1) 62:6
form (15) 21:25;22:1,5,6;24:10,14,18, 19,19,21;47:4;51:4,22;54:8,10
format (1) 57:6
forms (6) 23:14,15,15,19;55:23;56:1
forth (4) 16:24;22:9;66:8;70:4
forty (1) 60:4
forward (3) 59:20,21;63:18
foster (1) 12:22
found (1) 20:23
four (4) 51:24;52:15;59:25;63:23
framework (1) 68:19
frankly (2) 30:19;31:25
free (1) 58:21
front (3) 25:15;26:22;49:3
Fruitland (2) 4:12,13
fully (1) 13:7
function (1) 52:8
fundamental (1) 44:7
fundamentally (2)

35:18;37:9
further (5)
6:16;16:4;37:15;38:9;53:20
future (3)
6:9;7:6;33:25
G
gas (57)
4:22;8:23;12:6,24;13:2,4,5,9,
17,20;14:14,14;20:8;21:24;
30:18;31:3;32:17;33:1,6,10;
34:6;36:7;39:4,19,20;40:10,13;
41:2,9,9,15,17,21,24;44:18,20,
21;45:15;49:12;50:9,13;51:5;
52:11,15,21,22;53:1,23;54:6;
55:1,9,15;59:16,16,17;60:13; 62:24
gave (2)
23:14;68:15
general (5)
13:12;22:17;32:9;49:10,11
generalized (1)
48:8
generally (3)
23:21;55:1;56:3
gets (5)
29:2,3,4;60:16,17
Given (11)
6:21;14:4;22:21;30:16;31:6;
56:14,23;57:2;58:12,24;62:15
gives (1)
30:22
giving (1)
42:6
goal (1)
68:3
goes (5)
5:2,6;11:16;15:3;42:19
$\operatorname{good}(6)$
8:17;13:13;29:20;40:19;
45:7;58:10
government (2)
56:2,5
governments (2)
56:2,4
GOZZO (9)
4:3;8:7,9,13,17;48:22;57:5, 17;58:9
granted (2)
13:25;20:24
granting (1)
54:14
great (2) 41:7;55:3
greater (2)
13:5;41:12
greatest (2)
13:8,12
gross (2)
52:19,25
ground (1)
45:21
grounds (1)
37:13
groundwater (1) 45:4
guess (2)
28:15,16
guidance (4) 31:18,19;32:13;48:9
guide (1) 32:11

| $\mathbf{H}$ |
| :--- |

Hall (1)
4:12
handful (1) 47:21
hang (1) 4:9
hanging (1) 63:16
happen (3) 4:9;15:5;45:4
happened (2) 11:3,9
happening (1) 65:21
happens (1) 45:17
happy (4) 33:21;46:12;54:17;57:25
hard (2) 35:7;42:22
harder (1) 41:4
harm (6) 19:20;42:25;43:1,5,8,12
harms (1) 40:20
HATFIELD (6) 62:18,18,19,21;64:10,11
hear (6) 7:10;8:7;29:16;30:7,13;49:2
heard (3) 9:7;12:21;49:4
HEARING (80) 4:4,24;5:12,13,14,16;6:1,6,9, 15,23;7:8,9;8:11,14,18;9:17; 10:2,4,17,23;17:10;22:12,14, 16,23;25:3;26:2;27:6,14,24; 29:10,14,19,19;30:5,11;45:16; 46:13,22;48:14,23;49:21,22,24; 50:6;51:11,17;53:21;54:19; 56:8,11,16,25;57:3,9;58:1,6,10, 14,25;59:3,6,6,8,11,12,19,24; 61:18,19,20,25;62:12,19;64:9, 12;71:10,15,16
hearings (8)
4:8;6:4;7:6;59:14,21,21; 60:5;61:16
held (4) 6:9;13:23;43:13;48:21
Helen (3)

58:3,7,11
help (1) 54:24
helpful (3) 19:22;31:9;48:9
helps (1) 40:21
higher (1) 24:3
highly (3) 44:11;45:20;47:14
history (1) 32:1
hodgepodge (1) 17:5
hold (3) 9:17;22:13;30:8
holder (1) 33:7
holders (4) 12:12;42:13;68:20;69:10
holding (2) 10:2;40:11
home (3) 18:9;63:20;64:5
homeowners (1) 46:11
homes (1) 44:6
honest (1) 48:11
honestly (1) 46:2
Hopefully (2) 5:4;59:18
hundred (5) 24:8;55:2;63:23,23,23
hundred-dollars-or-less (1) 24:1
hundred-plus (1) 31:12
I

Idaho (36)

$$
4: 13,17,21,25 ; 7: 13 ; 9: 13
$$

$$
12: 25 ; 13: 2 ; 14: 1 ; 32: 9 ; 33: 6
$$

$$
38: 23 ; 39: 1 ; 40: 2 ; 41: 9 ; 47: 15,19
$$

21;48:1,5,7;49:6,10,13,16;50:3,
23;52:1,17;53:2;54:9,16,22,25; 55:7,15
Idaho's (2) 21:20;55:19
IDAPA (4)
5:15;15:16;16:24;50:3
identical (2) 21:19;42:24
identification (1) 50:7
identified (4)

$$
44: 10,11 ; 50: 17,18
$$

identifies (2)
51:24;53:18
identify (2) $\quad$ indication (1) 8:2;53:20
IDL (3)
26:3;50:11;59:22
IDL's (4)
49:15;50:7,17;53:18
ie (1) 16:11
ignore (1) 19:7
imagine (1) 42:22
impact (4) 25:11,17,21;51:1
impacted (1) 69:12
implicates (1) 44:7
implication (1) 34:21
implied (12)
16:14;21:14;33:14;34:18;
35:17,18;36:8,10;65:25;66:1,1, 9
implies (4) 45:6,7,7,8
imply (1) 66:15
important (7) 33:24,25;36:13;40:23;60:15, 21;65:20
impose (5) 10:3;16:25;17:2;26:4;41:21
imposed (4) 53:17;54:4,15;67:23
imposes (1) 53:23
impossible (1) 70:14
improve (1) 48:25
Inc (1) 57:21
include (4) 20:14;40:17;53:13;69:23
included (6) 33:12;47:5;51:12;52:17; 68:6;70:22
includes (8) 30:3;33:16;40:14;45:25; 46:3;52:13;68:7,7
including (5) 25:6;46:10;51:22;52:18;66:2
incorrect (2) 37:5;65:8
incredible (1) 44:8
incumbent (2) 53:24;54:3
indicate (1) 7:23
indicates (2) 6:5;51:8

17:24
individuals (1) 40:13
industrial (1) 46:1
industry (28)
23:7,10;24:25;30:19;31:3; 39:3;40:10;41:15,17;46:25; 47:2,10,11,13,19,25;48:2,4,5,8; 54:20,24;55:6;56:3,4,6;63:11, 14
inexpensive (1)
41:3
inferred (1)
60:2
information (4)
23:6,23;24:24;30:23
initially (1) 65:12
input (2) 18:14;50:7
instance (4)
24:4;38:20;45:19;47:10
insufficient (1) 35:12
integrate (1) 50:25
integrated (9)
51:1,2,9,16,19;52:5,10,24; 69:11
integrating (2)
50:20;52:6
integration (67)
4:16;7:7;9:12,20;10:21,23;
11:2,10,15;16:8,9,12,16;17:14,
24;18:1;20:3,10,15,18;21:18;
26:7,12;27:21;31:7,7,21;32:24; 36:25;38:11,22,23,25;39:25; 40:4;49:23;50:1;51:2,11,13,17; 52:1,8,13;53:13,16,22;54:10, 14;60:6,11,12,12,14,15,17,20, 21;61:7,11,19;65:10,17;66:11; 69:23;70:9;71:2
integrations (1) 60:9
Integrity (4)
30:1;41:13,15,16
intended (2)
10:23;17:25
intends (2)
17:7;51:15
intent (1)
49:14
intention (1)
71:1
interest (31)
6:20;12:12;15:24;17:16,18,
19;18:2,5,7,8;19:11,24,25;20:3,
24;24:15,22;25:2,8,15,23;
26:15;27:7;32:1;43:14;50:2,20;
56:20;65:18;68:20;69:10
interests (11)

20:18;43:20;46:10;52:3,7,10;
53:15;65:6,7,22;71:5
interference (1)
8:8
interstate (1) 20:17
into (13)
26:21;27:18,20;29:7;32:19;
36:1;37:4;39:12;42:19;47:7,17; 65:24;67:15
intrusion (1)
25:17
invalid (1) 37:4
invalidate (1) 37:19
invest (1) 17:17
investigate (1) 19:2
investigation (2) 16:10;67:16
invite (1) 64:25
invited (2) 22:18,25
involuntary (1) 15:22
involve (3) 10:4;19:1,2
involved (4) 42:21;43:21;55:8;60:6
involves (1) 20:16
IPUC (1) 14:1
irrelevant (3)
10:8,17;19:19
issue (6) 6:12;20:19;37:8;40:8;65:20; 71:13
issued (2) 16:21;50:19
issues (7) 10:5;11:20;18:22;21:2; 27:20;39:6,10
item (2) 67:3,18

|  |
| :--- |
| J |
| James (1) |
| $29: 24$ |
| job (9) |
| $30: 4,17 ; 34: 1 ; 35: 4 ; 39: 8 ;$ |
| $67: 24 ; 68: 11,17 ; 70: 14$ |
| jobs (2) |
| $63: 21,22$ |
| joined (2) |
| $8: 9 ; 57: 7$ |
| joint (5) |
| $15: 22 ; 17: 15 ; 23: 16 ; 24: 10,14$ |
| joint-operating-agreement $(\mathbf{1})$ |


| 11:17 | larger (2) | 28:8 | loud (1) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joy (1) | 24:7,7 | letter (1) | 30:12 |
| 49:10 | largest (1) | 51:7 | loudly (1) |
| Judge (8) | 61:2 | level (3) | 5:19 |
| 9:25;11:21;19:7;21:8;37:16; | Larsen (1) | 35:24;44:8;48:9 | low (1) |
| 66:22;67:15;68:1 | 29:25 | liked (1) | 20:20 |
| judges (1) | Larsens (1) | 62:4 | low-income (1) |
| 37:12 | 30:3 | likelihood (2) | 63:21 |
| judgment (1) | last (4) | 25:22;36:18 | Lynn (1) |
| 38:2 | 23:22;26:19;31:11;32:2 | Likewise (2) | 29:25 |
| jump (1) | later (1) | 21:5;24:10 |  |
| 30:7 | 6:10 | limit (2) | M |
| jurisdiction (2) | law (22) | 7:17;58:22 |  |
| 13:24;14:5 | 31:2,2;35:1,3,6,7,16;36:19; | limitation (3) | maintain (1) |
| jurisdictions (1) | 38:7;39:11;42:20;43:13,15; | 17:25;51:12,19 | 52:23 |
| 56:7 | 50:10;54:9,16;55:7;67:5;69:22, | limited (7) | majority (6) |
| jurisprudence (1) | 24;70:12;71:6 | 21:8;26:8;27:21,22;28:3; | 20:4;26:10,25;41:8;47:16; |
| 42:5 | laws (3) | 39:15;53:10 | 60:22 |
| justice (1) | 55:11,18;70:15 | line (1) | makes (3) |
| 30:25 | lawyer (1) | 26:22 | 14:21,21;41:3 |
|  | 32:15 | link (1) | making (5) |
| K | LEADER-PICONE (4) 57:19,20;58:2,4 | 6:1 listed (2) | $\begin{aligned} & 26: 15 ; 36: 22 ; 42: 9 ; 57: 23 \text {; } \\ & 68: 10 \end{aligned}$ |
| keep (9) | lean (3) | 52:15;54:12 | Malcolm (2) |
| 6:24;12:5;40:15;63:12,17; | 61:9,10,21 | literally (2) | 57:19;60:25 |
| 65:21;66:21,22;68:1 | lease (14) | 36:1;44:15 | Management (1) |
| keeps (1) | 11:16;23:15,20;27:25;28:18; | litigated (1) | 55:21 |
| 59:22 | 36:7;51:4,22,22;54:8;55:21,23; | 29:3 | manner (3) |
| Kevin (1) | 56:1;69:17 | litigation (1) | 12:25;13:4;67:11 |
| 29:24 | leased (5) | 47:23 | many (5) |
| kind (4) | 52:19;53:15,24;54:4,15 | little (4) | 5:11;28:10;37:22;39:6;47:9 |
| 32:4;55:24;62:3;63:12 | leaseholds (1) | 8:5;30:23;32:11;48:24 | Margery (1) |
| knew (1) | 41:24 | Live (4) | 29:25 |
| 22:24 | leases (8) | 5:24;6:1;64:4,4 | margin (1) |
| knocked (1) | 15:22;23:21;24:1,2;41:9; | LLC (1) | 48:3 |
| 5:5 | 47:7,16;59:16 | 8:23 | market (13) |
| knowing (2) | leasing (1) | locally (1) | 19:3;23:24;28:7;29:9;52:16, |
| 41:20,23 | 20:1 | 24:25 | 20,25;53:3,6,9;69:4,12,15 |
| knowledge (1) | least (7) | located (1) | material (1) |
| 71:5 | 9:25;11:11;27:14;28:3; | 57:22 | 5:24 |
| Kristina (1) | 47:23;54:1;57:11 | location (4) | matter (5) |
| 29:25 | leave (1) | 15:7;16:11;31:4;51:16 | 6:21;27:1;49:14;65:8;71:13 |
| L | 19:23 | locations (1) 31.8 | matters (1) |
| L | led (1) 18:3 | Lockner (1) | mature (1) |
| lacks (1) | left (3) | 61:3 | 15:23 |
| 26:5 | 34:20;36:8;57:10 | long (6) | maximizing (1) |
| laid (1) | legal (2) | 5:2;28:17,19;36:24;65:9; | 13:20 |
| 15:9 | 59:15;65:8 | 67:21 | maximum (1) |
| land (3) | legislation (1) | longer (1) | 35:24 |
| 25:7;45:3;55:21 | 34:16 | 18:25 | May (30) |
| Landmen (1) | legislative (1) | look (6) | 4:11;5:2,21;6:23;7:7,24;13:5, |
| 24:18 | 34:5 | 23:14;28:14;39:10;55:17,20; | 9,12;14:9;16:18;18:1;22:11; |
| landowners (2) | legislature (8) | 70:10 | 24:2;25:7;39:3;48:12;49:17,20; |
| 13:11;33:1 | 13:25;18:22;34:13;36:5; | looked (4) | 50:5,25,25;51:3;52:2,24;53:19; |
| Lands (4) | 50:14;53:10;68:13,15 | 21:23;55:11,12,12 | 55:22;66:12,13;67:7 |
| 7:14;25:6;44:10;49:13 | less (2) | looks (1) | Maybe (6) |
| Lands' (3) | 25:18;59:20 | $42: 3$ | $28: 10 ; 48: 18 ; 59: 21 ; 65: 20$ |
| 49:6,12;50:23 | lessee (2) | lose (1) | 69:18;70:14 |
| large (4) | 35:20;52:22 | 20:5 | mean (7) |
| 24:4,8;39:4;70:13 | lessor (3) | lot (7) | 13:15;26:23;32:4;34:1; |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { largely }(1) \\ 1 \cdot 17 \end{gathered}$ | 35:20,24;52:24 lessors (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 25:24;42:3,21,21;48:5;56:11; } \\ & 63: 8 \end{aligned}$ | $43: 10,10 ; 44: 15$ |
| $12: 17$ | lessors (1) | 63:8 | meaning (2) |


| 32:6;67:1 | miserly (1) | 24:25 | numbers (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| means (9) | 19:18 | natural (4) | 22:3;56:17 |
| 10:15;18:6;35:25;38:6; | Mister (2) | 12:24;13:13;20:8;40:22 | NW (1) |
| 43:11;60:2;67:17;68:9,17 | 8:20;65:2 | nature (2) | 4:19 |
| meant (1) | mobile (1) | 38:10;40:4 |  |
| 69:15 | 18:9 | nav (1) | 0 |
| meet (2) | modifier (1) | 4:23 |  |
| 19:10;70:6 | 15:1 | NE (1) | oath (1) |
| members (2) | moment (1) | 4:20 | 42:9 |
| 30:2;46:20 | 22:13 | near (4) | objection (1) |
| memorandum (3) | momentum (2) | 16:17;18:12;21:21;49:3 | 18:3 |
| 9:16;10:2,10 | 30:8;63:12 | nearby (1) | obligated (1) |
| mention (1) | money (2) | 55:10 | 40:1 |
| 57:6 | 59:14,15 | necessarily (5) | obligation (2) |
| merely (1) | months (2) | 16:14;33:19;40:6,12;66:9 | 50:11;70:12 |
| 19:19 | 60:4;61:14 | necessary (12) | obligations (2) |
| Meridian (1) | more (16) | 9:9;14:6,9;19:10;35:15; | 69:7,10 |
| 4:21 | 9:9;11:6,11;13:23;17:12 | 37:24;39:11;42:8;49:18;50:18; | observing (1) |
| merits (1) | 22:10,17;25:4;27:5;28:11; | 70:8,20 | 57:24 |
| 49:22 | 40:20;43:17;48:5;54:5;59:15; | necessity (1) | obtained (2) |
| Mesa (3) | 68:15 | 52:6 | 13:6,10 |
| 24:13;33:6;47:17 | Moreover (1) | need (5) | obvious (4) |
| metering (1) | 17:8 | 5:4;8:10;62:1;63:11;67:25 | 25:16;28:13;34:7,12 |
| 16:23 | most (6) | needs (1) | obviously (1) |
| methods (1) | 14:19;19:23;50:10,12;55:25; | $55: 14$ | $17: 6$ |
| $41: 2$ | $60: 15$ | neither (1) | occur (2) |
| Michael (1) | mostly (2) | 21:20 | 51:8;66:12 |
| 8:22 | 28:6;29:8 | Nevada (1) | occurs (2) |
| Mick (2) | Mountain (4) | 64:2 | 61:12;69:12 |
| 4:22;57:5 | 48:16,19;64:16,23 | new (4) | o'clock (1) |
| microphone (1) | move (3) | 9:17;10:2;54:23;55:1 | 64:15 |
| 5:21 | 9:8;57:16;59:20 | Next (3) | odd (2) |
| microphones (1) | moving (1) | 29:14;59:18;61:4 | $39: 3,5$ |
| 5:18 | 63:18 | nice (1) | off (4) |
| middle (1) | much (10) | 48:24 | 22:2;62:25;63:1;67:15 |
| 35:20 | 4:7;16:4;24:7;42:16;43:13; | ninety-nine (1) | offer (4) |
| might (2) | 47:18;48:23;59:13;64:8;71:17 | 23:25 | 49:25;58:8;62:5;64:25 |
| 8:10;36:1 | multiple (4) | nobody (2) | offering (1) |
| mind (7) | 11:4;17:11;32:21;61:15 | 32:2;45:7 | 19:18 |
| 6:24;12:5;34:13;65:21 | municipal (1) | nonconsenting (1) | Office (1) |
| 66:21,22;68:1 | $46: 3$ | 43:19 | 49:11 |
| mineral (48) | must (4) | none (1) | OFFICER (41) |
| 6:20;9:4;16:4,5;17:12;18:2,4, | 12:5;16:6;31:24;68:16 | $47: 22$ | $4: 4 ; 8: 11,14,18 ; 22: 12,16,23$ |
| $6,8,11,13,15,20,24 ; 19: 1,11,14$ | mute (4) | noneconomic (3) | 25:3;26:2;27:24;29:10,14,19; |
| 17,25;20:6,13,18;21:3,6,21; | 5:17,20;8:10;57:4 | 27:25;28:16;42:23 | 30:5,11;46:13,22;48:14,23; |
| 25:8,15,23;26:15;27:7;31:13; | muted (2) | nonetheless (1) | 54:19;56:8,11,16,25;57:3,9; |
| 32:8;40:12;41:4,9,21,23;42:13; | 5:22;57:8 | 35:15 | 58:1,6,10,14,25;59:3,6,7,8; |
| 43:6;50:2,20;56:20;60:24;65:6; | myself (1) | nonlawyer (1) | 61:25;62:12,19;64:9,12;71:10 |
| 68:25;69:11;70:21;71:4 | 67:25 | 60:2 | officers' (1) |
| minerals (3) |  | nor (1) | 10:17 |
| 4:23;20:2;32:7 | N | 16:13 | OGCC (3) |
| minimize (1) |  | norm (2) | 6:3;26:5;64:19 |
| 53:11 | name (7) | 24:9;25:1 | OGCCIdahogov (2) |
| minimum (3) | 4:22;7:22,23;49:7,9;62:17,18 | normal (1) | 5:25;64:21 |
| 52:11;53:13;54:2 | Nancy (5) | 56:5 | OGCCIdahogov/administrative (1) |
| minorities (1) | 57:13,15,17,20;58:4 | Normally (1) | 6:4 |
| $60: 22$ | narrow (1) | 31:8 | OGR (1) |
| minority (1) | 37:8 | North (4) | 50:22 |
| 20:4 | narrowest (1) | 4:20;47:11;63:15;64:3 | oil (53) |
| minutes (5) | $37: 13$ | notice (5) | $4: 22 ; 8: 23 ; 9: 13 ; 12: 6,24 ; 13: 2$ |
| 5:3;7:18;48:18;58:23;62:20 | nation (1) | 6:5;18:16;27:5,12;66:3 | 4,5,9,17,20;14:13, 14;21:24; |
| misapprehension (1) | 39:4 | number (2) | 30:18;31:2;32:17;33:1,6,10; |
| 69:18 | nationally (1) | 27:8;65:9 | 34:6;36:7;39:4,19,20;40:10; |


| 41:2,9,15,17,21,24;44:21; | 5:9 | owners/lessors (1) | 71:7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 45:15;49:12;50:9,12;51:5; | order (37) | 25:2 | penalty (2) |
| 52:11,15,20,22;53:1,22;54:6; | 4:16;9:20;10:1,16,21;16:16 | ownership (1) | 11:18;22:4 |
| 55:1,9,15;59:16,16,17;60:13; | 17;17:14;21:20,25;22:1,6; | 40:14 | pending (2) |
| 62:24 | 23:14;26:7;27:21;29:1,5;36:25; | owns (1) | 32:8;60:17 |
| old (1) | 39:25;40:7,24;50:19;51:2,3,13, | 25:23 | Pennsylvania (1) |
| 67:7 | 20;52:6,8,13,24;53:16;54:10, |  | 47:12 |
| once (1) | 14;67:16,23;69:23;70:9 | P | people (15) |
| 29:4 | ordered (1) |  | 18:10;27:13;30:6;32:9;44:2, |
| one (30) | 9:16 | pa | 23,25;45:1,2;46:16,19;63:20, |
| 8:3;10:5,11;11:10;13:23; | orders (8) | pa | 22;64:2,4 |
| 17:24;23:2,17;27:24;34:9; | 14:8;16:15;26:12;31:7 | paid (2) | people's (1) |
| $39: 13 ; 41: 13 ; 43: 24 ; 44: 1,1$ | 38:11,22,23,25 | 35:24;44:3 | 44:6 |
| 45:23;47:17,23;48:10;54:20; | others (1) | paramount (1) | per (1) |
| 57:5;58:2,3,25;59:3,25,25; | $65: 7$ | 14:18 | 18:2 |
| 60:11;61:20;70:17 | otherwise (4) | parcel (1) | percent (2) |
| one's (2) | 14:15;15:20;44:7;71:7 | 51:2 | 19:24;61:4 |
| 39:19,20 | ought (1) | parcels (4) | perform (1) |
| only (11) | 70:24 | 51:1,9,16,19 | 35:5 |
| 6:14;10:6;15:1;19:9;20:11 | out (17) | pardon (1) | perhaps (2) |
| 31:18;34:8;39:18;43:7;54:16; | 5:5;14:9;15:7,9;19:23;27:4 | 6:14 | $9: 24 ; 55: 20$ |
| $69: 19$ | 28:7;33:11;34:7;35:2,10;36:10; | park (1) | period (2) |
| opening (6) | 38:10;48:12;57:1;60:18;70:23 | 18:10 | 61:12;65:9 |
| 18:13;23:3;49:14;50:17,24; | outcome (1) | part (7) | permit (4) |
| 51:23 | $18: 18$ | $6: 22 ; 16: 12 ; 36: 17 ; 47: 5$ | 16:21;27:15;28:22;70:2 |
| operate (1) | outcomes (2) | $51: 12,20 ; 60: 21$ | permitted (1) |
| 68:11 | 17:8;19:6 | participants (2) | 54:16 |
| operating (6) | outgoing (1) | 12:2;59:23 | person (6) |
| 8:4;15:22;17:15;23:16 | 21:6 | participate (9) | 5:13;7:19;56:13,21;58:20; |
| 24:10,14 | outside (1) | 6:23;7:6;17:12,14;18:1;27:8; | 59:4 |
| operation (4) | 55:14 | $45: 9 ; 56: 21 ; 66: 13$ | personally (1) |
| 16:11,19;44:23;71:6 | outsiders (1) | participating (2) | 55:8 |
| operational (5) | 45:2 | 17:18;71:12 | persons (2) |
| 15:16,25;26:20;27:20;33:7 | over (15) | participation (3) | 14:5;17:25 |
| operations (6) | 4:24;5:6;14:5;23:22,24;26:5 | 11:18;18:4,9 | pertain (1) |
| 12:16;13:3;16:20;17:13 | 27:8;31:11;32:2;44:6;47:4; | particular (7) | 51:25 |
| 24:16;47:9 | 55:2;61:14;65:9,24 | 30:20;32:4,23;35:8;37:21 | phone (1) |
| operator (19) | overall (2) | 46:2;69:17 | 61:1 |
| 15:20,24,25;16:19;17:21; | 36:3;43:22 | parties (10) | phrase (1) |
| 24:6;25:1;27:2,11;29:6;44:22; | owe (1) | $10: 5 ; 18: 9 ; 23: 4 ; 29: 22 ; 32: 21$ | 37:18 |
| 54:5;59:13;69:21,25;70:1,14, | 45:2 | $33: 9 ; 58: 19 ; 59: 24 ; 60: 16,17$ | physical (1) |
| 24;71:1 | own (10) | partners (4) | $25: 16$ |
| operators (3) | 7:23;18:7,11;24:22;30:17; | 15:25;17:17;24:15,22 | physically (1) |
| 12:11;24:12;60:19 | 34:15;40:11;41:22;62:4;67:5 | parts (1) | 25:7 |
| operator's (1) | owned (1) | 60:15 | piece (2) |
| 16:3 | 24:4 | party (2) | 24:7;67:22 |
| opportunities (1) | owner (12) | 6:18;12:10 | Piotrowski (15) |
| 27:6 | 13:16;15:11;18:5;25:8,11,23; | passed (1) | 29:15,16,18,23,24;30:9,1 |
| opportunity (12) | 32:7;52:24;53:15;57:21;61:2; | 7:5 | 46:14,21;47:2;49:5;59:22;65:4, |
| $7: 14 ; 13: 15 ; 26: 17 ; 27: 6,13,17$ | 70:21 | patience | 23;68:5 |
| $56: 18 ; 57: 11 ; 58: 16 ; 62: 15$ | owners ( | $64: 25$ | Piotrowski's (1) |
| 64:18;68:20 | 6:20;7:4,12;9:4;13:6,11; | pause (9) | 65:11 |
| opposing (15) | 14:25;16:4,5;17:12;18:2,15,15, | 22:15,21;30:10;48:17;56:14, | Pipeline (3) |
| 9:4;16:5,9;18:6,12,20,24; | 21,24;19:1,11,14,17;20:7;21:4, | 23;57:2;58:12,24 | 20:8;25:7,14 |
| 19:14,17;20:6;21:3,6,21;68:25; | 21;26:16;27:7,8;31:12,13,13; | pay (1) | place (5) |
| 70:21 | 32:8;35:22;36:16;41:4,22; | 44:18 | 28:9,11;44:24;47:3,3 |
| opposite (3) | 43:19;50:2,20;52:18,19;53:17, | Payette (1) | places (2) |
| 17:5;36:22;43:12 | 24;54:15;56:20;69:11 | 4:21 | 28:14;64:1 |
| option (1) | owners' (6) | paying (1) | plaintiffs (1) |
| 28:18 | $18: 13 ; 21: 6 ; 25: 6 ; 53: 8 ; 65: 6$ | $63: 22$ | 37:23 |
| options (1) | 68:25 | payment (6) | plan (2) |
| 11:18 | owner's (2) | 15:9;35:21,23;41:10,12,19 | 6:13;56:21 |
| oral (1) | 18:7;25:15 | penalties (1) | play (1) |


| 12:15 | preliminary (1) | proceedings (4) | 42:3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| please (10) | 8:24 | 18:17;22:15;30:10;31:8 | proposition (2) |
| 5:17,18,24;7:23;8:2,18;9:8; | prepare (1) | process (37) | 20:10;21:3 |
| 29:21;49:7;62:10 | 42:7 | 9:18,22;10:12;11:13,16;12:1; | protect (5) |
| Plevenger (1) | prepared (1) | 16:12;18:1,23,25;19:10;20:25; | 14:14,23;20:3;43:20;68:17 |
| 29:25 | 70:25 | 32:14,16,16;33:8,9,17;34:2; | protected (1) |
| Plevengers (1) | prescribe (1) | 37:18,22;38:7,15;39:13,24; | 13:7 |
| 30:3 | 52:2 | 43:8,13, 15,22;44:2;50:4;53:22; | protecting (1) |
| plug (1) | presentation (2) | 65:5,17;66:11,24;67:24 | 15:1 |
| 70:3 | 53:21;57:23 | processes (2) | protection (1) |
| plugging (1) | presented (3) | 55:12;68:18 | 12:16 |
| 16:23 | 33:12;51:10,17 | processing (1) | protections (1) |
| pm (2) | presenting (1) | 19:4 | 15:11 |
| 4:11;64:22 | 31:7 | produce (8) | prove (1) |
| podium (1) | presiding (1) | 13:16;39:18,20;40:13,18; | 43:14 |
| 58:22 | 4:24 | 48:6;54:6;63:2 | provide (8) |
| point (7) | presumably (1) | produced (2) | 12:25;13:3;23:6;32:12;48:9; |
| 12:2;23:25;29:4;36:19;40:1; | 49:25 | $28: 12,13$ | $49: 15 ; 58: 21 ; 64: 14$ |
| 48:1;59:25 | pretend (1) | producers (1) | provided (6) |
| pointing (1) | 44:7 | 13:11 | 4:17;15:10,11;17:13;37:21; |
| 38:10 | pretty (5) | producing (8) | 68:12 |
| points (3) | 21:19;23:3;27:21,22;64:8 | 11:14,15;15:23;16:17;21:14; | provides (2) |
| 36:14;47:5;49:15 | prevent (4) | 28:10;59:17;60:13 | 14:11;52:2 |
| poison (1) | 12:25;14:14,23;16:8 | production (16) | providing (4) |
| 45:4 | prevented (1) | $12: 12,13,16,23 ; 13: 2,20$ | 42:7,7;63:21,22 |
| police (2) | 61:6 | $14: 13,23 ; 15: 15 ; 26: 18 ; 34: 10$ | proving (1) |
| 12:9;65:18 | preventing (1) | 47:22,23;52:19,25;68:21 | 41:18 |
| policy (2) | 12:14 | Professional (1) | provision (1) |
| 12:22;34:9 | prevention (2) | 24:18 | 29:2 |
| pool (3) | 14:18;26:14 | profit (1) | provisions (7) |
| 13:16,17,21 | previous (3) | 48:3 | 14:7,10;15:2;21:7;50:8,12; |
| pooling (8) | 10:5;11:8;16:15 | prohibiting (1) | $51: 4$ |
| 11:15;16:16;20:18;21:17,18, | price (1) | 60:22 | public (7) |
| 25;26:12;65:17 | 44:19 | prohibits (1) | 7:17;12:22;13:12;14:6;34:9; |
| poorly (1) | primary (2) | 60:22 | 58:21;62:8 |
| $35: 7$ | 12:11;28:25 | project (1) | purely (2) |
| portal (1) | printed (1) | 70:18 | 43:16;46:6 |
| 56:16 | 22:1 | promote (1) | purpose (12) |
| portion (1) | prior (6) | 12:23 | 12:6,11;21:12;26:4;34:4,5,8, |
| $43: 3$ | $10: 24 ; 24: 12 ; 35: 12 ; 37: 19$ $38: 22,24$ | promulgated (1) | $24 ; 35: 14,16 ; 36: 9 ; 68: 4$ |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { portions (1) } \\ 69: 24 \end{gathered}$ | $38: 22,24$ private (1) | $\begin{gathered} 15: 14 \\ \text { proof }(2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { purposes (3) } \\ & 34: 11,12 ; 60: 14 \end{aligned}$ |
| pose (3) | 14:6 | 25:11;49:25 | pursuant (3) |
| 46:23,24;54:20 | proactively (1) | proper (1) | 4:25;16:21;50:2 |
| posed (1) | 69:23 | $40: 16$ | pushing (1) |
| 31:1 | probably (3) | properly (1) | 61:14 |
| position (4) | 8:25;56:6;64:15 | 67:13 | put (2) |
| 18:21;43:25;45:11,13 | problem (1) | properties (1) | 23:3;64:6 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { possible (3) } \\ 4: 7 ; 13: 9,13 \end{gathered}$ | 37:20 <br> procedural (6) | $\begin{gathered} \text { 13:4 } \\ \text { property (15) } \end{gathered}$ | Q |
| possibly (1) | 18:23;33:16,18;41:2,6;43:19 | 14:6;18:15;20:23;25:20; |  |
| $70: 11$ | procedurally (1) | 31:2,12,13,15;39:24;40:3,20; | quarter-acre (1) |
| posted (1) | 62:3 | 42:25;45:3;46:3;57:21 | 25:24 |
| 27:16 | procedure (8) | proposal (1) | quiet (1) |
| Power (11) | 11:23;39:22;41:3;42:2;66:3, | 36:3 | 57:16 |
| 14:1,7;19:1;20:8,20;24:5; | 10,15,16 | propose (1) | quite (2) |
| 42:7;44:6;65:19;66:3;68:14 | proceed (1) | 21:10 | 21:8;43:12 |
| powers (1) | 7:9 | proposed (10) | quote (3) |
| 50:10 | proceeded (1) | 7:2,12;15:18;24:20;26:9; | 9:17;18:16;19:3 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { preacher (1) } \\ 68: 14 \end{gathered}$ | 37:11 proceeding (7) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 28:1,6,22;45:14;56:20 } \\ & \text { proposes (2) } \end{aligned}$ | $\mathbf{R}$ |
| predominantly (1) | proceeding (7) 6:22,23;22:1;30:20;37:19; | $15: 20 ; 26: 3$ | R |
| $28: 3$ | 42:4;52:1 | proposing (1) | raise (2) |


| 32:5,6 | recite (2) | 35:19;53:14 | 47:3;70:18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| raised (1) | 11:23;70:8 | relating (1) | residential (1) |
| 37:23 | reclamation (1) | 16:8 | 46:1 |
| Range (2) | 15:15 | relationship (1) | residents (1) |
| 4:20;66:2 | recognition (1) | 35:19 | 18:10 |
| rangeland (1) | 40:22 | relatively (5) | resolve (1) |
| 46:7 | recognize (2) | 10:3;11:19;34:12,16;37:8 | 37:14 |
| rate (10) | 42:12;67:9 | relevant (7) | resolved (1) |
| 20:7,19,24;31:21;35:21,21; | recognized (5) | 10:8;21:7;44:11;49:18; | 8:12 |
| 42:17,18,18;43:7 | 34:21;65:13,16;67:1,17 | 50:19;51:25;53:16 | resources (2) |
| rates (1) | recommends (1) | relief (1) | 12:24;13:13 |
| 20:16 | 51:11 | 17:21 | $\boldsymbol{r e s p e c t ~ ( 2 ) ~}$ |
| rate-setting (3) | reconcile (1) | remedy (1) | 16:3;69:1 |
| 21:5;39:16;42:15 | 28:1 | 37:21 | respectfully (1) |
| rather (1) | record (5) | remember (1) | 12:4 |
| 30:16 | 4:10;6:2;7:22;8:2;49:7 | 46:2 | respond (2) |
| rattling (1) | recorded (2) | reminded (1) | 7:4;70:25 |
| 22:14 | 5:14;64:22 | 5:20 | responded (1) |
| reach (1) | recording (8) | remotely (1) | 6:21 |
| 32:10 | 4:3;5:16,16;15:10;48:17,22; | 5:23 | responding (1) |
| reached (1) | 71:18,19 | render (1) | 9:3 |
| 21:1 | records (2) | 17:1 | response (13) |
| reaching (1) | 41:18;52:23 | repeat (3) | 5:11;22:21,22;33:20;56:14, |
| 15:17 | recovery (3) | 12:21;21:9;36:11 | 15,23,24;57:2;58:12,13,24;66:6 |
| reading (1) | 13:5,9;20:13 | repeatedly (2) | result (3) |
| 14:20 | redundant (1) | 65:5,5 | 33:4,5;50:6 |
| real (1) | 9:6 | repeating (1) | resulted (1) |
| 57:21 | reference (2) | 67:25 | 47:23 |
| realize (2) | 14:25;49:15 | reply (3) | results (1) |
| 13:12;31:1 | referred (1) | 19:17;20:6;21:16 | 69:17 |
| really (8) | 65:4 | report (1) | resume (1) |
| 42:22;55:6;63:7,16,19,20; | referring (1) | 70:7 | 48:19 |
| 64:17;66:6 | 59:22 | reporting (4) | review (2) |
| reason (1) | reflect (2) | 16:23;69:7,9,11 | 20:12;55:5 |
| 31:11 | 46:5,9 | reports (2) | reviewed (1) |
| reasonable (62) | reflected (1) | 52:18,23 | 5:8 |
| 4:17;6:7,8,13;7:1,2;9:12; | 26:12 | represent (3) | reviewer (1) |
| $10: 9 ; 11: 1 ; 15: 18,21 ; 16: 2,6$ | regard (2) | 29:21;46:19;49:8 | $38: 13$ |
| $18: 14 ; 20: 15 ; 23: 8,11,23 ; 25: 5,$ | 60:8;61:11 | representational (1) | Richard (1) |
| 12,13,22;26:7;28:23;30:21; | regarding (6) | 30:2 | 59:8 |
| 31:24;32:3,13;34:1,14,19;35:9; | 23:7,7;26:5;46:25;54:21; | representative (3) | right (21) |
| 36:4,25;37:2,18;38:21;41:5; | 67:16 | 7:23;8:1;40:10 | 28:10;29:12;30:8;39:18,19; |
| 43:23;44:12,16;45:6,20,24; | region (2) | representing (4) | 40:14,15,19,22,24;42:13,15; |
| 47:1;49:19,20;50:5;52:14; | 55:13,17 | 7:24;30:2;58:3;59:25 | 45:11,14;48:20;49:5;54:5; |
| 53:12,20;54:22;59:10,12,20; | regional (1) | represents (1) | 58:18;59:14;62:6;68:8 |
| 60:1,7,8,10;61:18;67:17;69:20 | 55:23 | 59:2 | rights (32) |
| reasonable' (3) | regulate (1) | request (3) | 13:6,15;14:15,23;15:2;18:11; |
| 9:21;10:15,21 | 14:13 | 6:17,19;28:1 | 20:13,22;26:14;31:13;33:7; |
| reasonably (2) | regulated (1) | requested (1) | 35:20;39:18,24;40:9,12,12,16, |
| 14:9;34:17 | 20:17 | 41:6 | 17;41:4,23;42:13;43:7,18,22; |
| reasons (2) | regulation (4) | require (3) | 44:8;60:23,24;68:6,9,17,22 |
| 31:25;34:7 | 13:1;17:3;65:17,22 | 16:2;38:20;52:24 | risk (3) |
| rebuttal (6) | regulations (1) | required (4) | 11:18;17:17;22:4 |
| 7:15;62:5,9,10;64:13;65:1 | 14:8 | 5:15;9:25;10:6;34:2 | River (22) |
| receive (5) | regulator (1) | requirement (6) | 7:11,14;8:23;11:9;19:18; |
| 12:13;20:2;26:17;35:22; | $12: 9$ | $20: 14 ; 31: 22,23 ; 38: 1,5 ; 66: 23$ | $21: 10 ; 24: 13,20 ; 33: 1,6,10 ; 34: 6$ |
| 68:20 | regulatory (2) | requirements (16) | 41:21,24;45:15;51:5;52:22; |
| received (1) | 50:8;55:16 | 12:18;15:7,8,10,16,19;16:1,3, | 59:9;62:5,9;64:13,24 |
| 6:17 | re-held (1) | 25;17:5;19:10;27:6;50:1; | River's (2) |
| Recess (2) | 10:24 | 52:11;53:14;54:2 | 8:1;32:15 |
| 48:21,24 | related (4) | requires (3) | role (3) |
| recesses (1) | 42:11;43:22,23;49:20 | 43:15;52:19;53:7 | 12:15,17;30:2 |
| 5:3 | relates (2) | research (2) | rolling (1) |


| 63:4 | Section (19) | 43:11 | 7:21;47:16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| room (7) | 4:18,19,19,20;14:20;15:9,12; | significant (2) | specific (5) |
| 5:5;8:10;46:16;56:22;59:1; | 16:7,13,21;17:23;18:2,17;50:3, | 10:14;11:22 | 11:7;17:8;18:18;19:5;21:7 |
| 62:16;71:12 | 23;51:23;53:18;54:12;69:5 | similar (2) | specifically (2) |
| rounds (4) | Sections (4) | 21:14;55:19 | 13:25;29:22 |
| 9:22;11:4,6,12 | 15:8,10;49:16;51:24 | Similarly (1) | specification (1) |
| routinely (1) | seek (1) | 14:11 | 10:6 |
| 34:6 | 69:24 | simple (2) | spend (3) |
| royalties (1) | seem (1) | 11:19;43:25 | 8:25;9:3;60:4 |
| 51:25 | 39:3 | simply (6) | spending (3) |
| royalty (22) | sell (13) | 10:23;16:18;37:5;38:3;39:1, | 59:13,14,15 |
| 11:17;13:11;15:9;17:19; | 31:15;39:19,20;40:14,23; | 6 | sphere (1) |
| 22:3;24:2,3;25:2;35:20,21,23; | 42:14,24;43:2,6;44:5,18;54:6; | single (3) | 27:19 |
| 41:10;42:17;52:3,7,9,18,21; | 68:8 | 38:12;46:24;70:17 | spontaneous (1) |
| 53:7,8,15;69:10 | selling (2) | sister (1) | 5:2 |
| rubric (1) | 40:2,3 | 56:7 | stand (3) |
| 38:7 | sentence (2) | site (2) | 21:3;30:5;58:21 |
| rules (18) | 53:2,5 | 5:25;64:19 | standard (10) |
| 12:19;14:8;15:14;16:1,24; | separate (3) | sitting (1) | 24:18;51:4,21;54:8;55:21,22, |
| 17:1,22;26:24;27:2,3,23;49:16; | 33:18;52:6;66:3 | 38:13 | 24,25;63:11,14 |
| 50:16;55:16,16;62:4;67:21; | serious (1) | situation (1) | standards (21) |
| 70:24 | 41:14 | 31:17 | 23:7,10;46:25;47:2,10,12,13, |
| running (1) | set (15) | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i x }}$ (2) | 14,19,20,25;48:2,4,5,8,10; |
| $63: 25$ | 4:14;11:19;15:7;16:24;22:9; | 28:10;60:4 | $54: 21 ; 55: 6,7 ; 70: 3,6$ |
| S | 27:4;31:23;35:21,23;36:10,24, 52:9;66:8,14;70:4 | $\underset{24: 3}{\text { slightly (1) }}$ | $\underset{58: 25}{\text { standing (1) }}$ |
|  | setbacks (1) | small (2) | start (3) |
| safe (1) | 15:9 | 62:23;65:20 | 34:3;57:10;63:4 |
| 12:16 | setting (7) | Snake (24) | started (6) |
| sale (3) | 23:10;31:21;34:2;42:17; | 7:10,14;8:1,23;11:9;19:18; | 4:3;38:19;45:13;48:22; |
| 42:19;43:23;65:7 | 47:1;48:13;54:21 | 21:10;24:13,20;32:15;33:1,6, | 62:23;69:14 |
| same (7) | settings (1) | 10;34:6;41:20,24;45:15;51:5; | state (20) |
| 10:5;11:9;23:5;24:13,21; | 69:16 | 52:22;59:9;62:4,9;64:13,24 | 7:21;11:14,15;12:22,24;13:2, |
| 31:22;69:3 | several (2) | sold (1) | 10;16:17;29:21;31:15;34:10; |
| satisfied (1) | 15:6;38:11 | 53:1 | 40:2;44:6;49:7;54:23;55:1; |
| 38:8 | severance (2) | somebody (7) | 56:2,4;62:16;67:6 |
| satisfy (3) | 53:8,11 | 8:9;31:16;40:2,3;42:24;43:6; | stated (8) |
| 38:4,15;39:11 | shall (2) | 44:17 | 10:1,16;12:6;34:4;49:14; |
| satisfying (1) | 35:22;52:4 | somebody's (1) | 52:20;53:8;66:18 |
| 38:1 | share (9) | 26:22 | statement (5) |
| saw (1) | 12:13;13:17;23:8;26:16,17; | somehow (1) | 34:5,8,9;51:10;57:24 |
| 48:25 | 46:25;53:8;54:20;68:21 | 43:16 | statements (2) |
| saying (1) | shift (1) | someone (4) | 42:1,9 |
| 28:15 | 44:22 | 24:4;30:7;43:2;44:5 | states (19) |
| schemes (1) | shifting (1) | somewhat (2) | 12:21;15:23;21:14;26:13; |
| 21:15 | 45:7 | 26:1;32:14 | 31:19;38:11,24;39:5;55:11,17, |
| Schultz (7) | short (1) | soon (1) | 25;60:13,14;61:9,10,11,16,19, |
| 9:14;10:1;19:8;37:8;38:2,5; | 34:3 | 29:6 | $21$ |
| 65:11 | shortsighted (1) | sort (2) | states' (1) |
| scope (10) | 38:6 | 65:19;67:15 | 55:18 |
| 6:6,12,24;12:7;17:10;21:8, | show (1) | Sounds (1) | State's (1) |
| 12;26:6;28:2;69:3 | 70:16 | 8:17 | 65:18 |
| script (1) | shut (3) | southwest (2) | statute (31) |
| 4:5 | 22:13;63:6,7 | 47:19,21 | 13:22;16:13,18;17:24;20:3; |
| SE (1) | shuts (2) | spacing (10) | 26:24;27:22;35:22,23;36:17, |
| 4:18 | 63:6;64:7 | 4:18;6:20;15:7;45:25;46:2,6; | 23;37:4,6;38:21;39:9;44:16; |
| search (1) | sight (1) | 50:21;51:9;61:17,17 | 53:14;65:25;66:1,5,8,9,14,15; |
| 37:4 | 20:5 | speak (9) | 67:3;68:2,9,14,23;70:4,23 |
| Second (6) | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { s i g n }}$ (1) | 5:18;7:25;22:24;29:16,18; | statutes (5) |
| 12:3;15:13;17:20;21:12; | 17:15 | 58:16,19;62:15;64:18 | 20:10;21:19;50:16;52:15; |
| 37:7;53:5 | signed (1) | speakers (1) | 55:25 |
| seconds (1) | 58:19 | 48:25 | statutory (22) |
| 57:4 | significance (1) | speaks (2) | 21:14,25;26:12;31:22;33:14, |


| 15;34:4,11,19,24;35:14,15,17, | 69:20 | 21:25 | 60:16;64:6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 18;36:9,10;50:1,8;53:14;54:1; | suitable (1) | ten (3) | told (1) |
| 68:11,19 | 48:3 | 5:3;23:22;59:14 | 41:11 |
| stay (1) | summarized (1) | term (10) | tomorrow (2) |
| 63:17 | 16:2 | 7:1;11:17;15:18;16:6;28:17, | 64:16,23 |
| step (3) | supersede (2) | 25;60:8,12;67:1;69:17 | tool (2) |
| 30:20;35:2;40:23 | 51:3,20 | terms (57) | 42:4;54:10 |
| steps (2) | supplying (1) | 4:15;6:8,25;7:2;9:12,19;10:9, | tools (2) |
| 41:6;67:13 | 71:2 | 20;11:1,17;15:18,20;18:14; | 42:10;43:19 |
| still (4) | support (2) | 19:19;20:14;23:11,24;25:5; | Township (1) |
| 7:5;21:13;35:10;48:12 | 18:21;51:10 | 26:3,4,7,8,9,11;28:1,3,4;31:23; | 4:20 |
| stop (1) | supported (1) | 33:21;36:2,6,24;37:1;41:5,21; | tradition (1) |
| 71:18 | 19:21 | 42:19;43:23;44:4;45:14;47:1; | 37:10 |
| stopped (1) | Supreme (4) | 51:3,21;52:2,9,13;53:12,17; | transaction (2) |
| $37: 9$ | 13:23;20:7,9;31:20 | 54:1,5,11,15,22;56:1,2;60:18; | 43:21;60:18 |
| stripped-down (1) | sure (18) | 69:23;71:3 | transmission (1) |
| 41:3 | 4:6;8:4;22:20,24;24:3,12; | test (2) | 19:4 |
| strong (1) | 26:15;29:15,16;30:6;37:6; | 41:25;42:5 | treating (1) |
| $32: 1$ | 45:17;57:10;58:16;62:1,11; | testimony (2) | 16:23 |
| stub (2) | 64:21;69:2 | 10:18;61:9 | treatment (1) |
| 52:21;53:9 | surface (14) | testing (3) | 27:11 |
| stubs (1) | 12:17;14:25;15:11;25:15,22; | 8:15,16;16:22 | treatments (1) |
| 53:7 | 26:1,22;27:7;43:1,5;45:19; | Texas (1) | 15:15 |
| stuck (2) | 51:1,15,18 | 47:13 | tribunal (4) |
| 31:17;33:10 | surface-use (3) | thanks (2) | 53:25;54:4,13;55:14 |
| stuff (1) | 50:24;51:4,21 | 4:5;56:11 | tried (2) |
| 63:2 | surprisingly (1) | therefore (4) | 48:2,25 |
| sub (2) | $40: 9$ | 26:8;43:16;53:24;54:12 | true (2) |
| $15: 1 ; 69: 5$ | surrounding (1) | THOMAS (52) | $18: 21 ; 41: 8$ |
| subject (9) | 27:12 | 4:4,22;8:11,14,18;22:12,16, | truth (4) |
| $9: 7 ; 11: 5 ; 15: 25 ; 18: 9 ; 27: 1$ | survive (2) | $23 ; 25: 3 ; 26: 2 ; 27: 24 ; 29: 10,14,$ | 41:25;42:5,10;43:20 |
| $45: 19 ; 69: 25 ; 71: 6,7$ | $20: 11,11$ | $19 ; 30: 4,5,11,16 ; 31: 4 ; 32: 11$ | $\operatorname{try}(4)$ |
| subjects (4) | suss (1) | 36:16;38:18;40:9;42:16;46:13, | 4:6;9:1;35:3;65:3 |
| 12:9;15:6;26:5;27:9 | 48:11 | 22;48:14,23;49:9;54:19,25; | trying (5) |
| submit (2) | SW (1) | 56:8,11,16,25;57:3,9;58:1,6,10, | 19:19;33:11;41:21;45:23; |
| 21:11;70:1 | 4:19 | 14,25;59:3,6;61:25;62:12,19, | 63:17 |
| submittal (1) | system (1) | 21;64:9,11,12;71:10 | turn (4) |
| 6:11 | 30:25 | thorough (1) | 5:19;29:6;51:20;54:3 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { submitted (3) } \\ & 7: 8 ; 51: 5 ; 54: 8 \end{aligned}$ | T | 14:20 though (1) | $\begin{array}{\|c} \hline \text { twelve (2) } \\ 23: 22 ; 60: 4 \end{array}$ |
| subpoena (4) |  | 44:19 | two (6) |
| 19:1;41:18;42:7;66:3 | table (3) | thousand (4) | 24:23;28:13;48:12;59:24; |
| subsection (3) | 60:17;66:20,20 | 23:21;25:20,25;28:8 | $60: 3,15$ |
| 52:17;53:3,4 | takers (1) | thousands (1) | type (1) |
| subsequent (1) | 19:25 | 47:15 | 5:13 |
| 52:6 | talk (6) | three (5) | types (1) |
| substantive (4) | 27:14;33:22;41:1;57:12; | 25:20,25;40:5;57:7;63:22 | 47:9 |
| 33:16;39:13;42:12;43:21 | 59:9,11 | throughout (1) | typical (1) |
| substitute (1) | talking (3) | 13:2 | 5:12 |
| 51:3 | 25:18;34:18;60:10 | Thursday (1) | typically (2) |
| subsurface (2) | task (4) | 4:11 | 61:16,20 |
| 43:3,4 | 11:19;35:6;38:19;45:22 | tie (1) | tyranny (1) |
| successfully (2) | taught (1) | 24:6 | $20: 4$ |
| 28:12,13 | 37:13 | timeframes (1) |  |
| sudden (1) | $\boldsymbol{t a x}$ (1) | 66:12 | $\mathbf{U}$ |
| 63:5 | 53:11 | times (1) |  |
| suggest (1) | taxes (1) | 59:14 | uhs (1) |
| 12:4 | 53:8 | Title (1) | 4:7 |
| suggested (2) | teaches (1) | 51:24 | ultimate (4) |
| 16:6;68:7 | 42:20 | today (9) | 13:5,20;68:3,4 |
| suggestion (3) | telling (3) | $4: 24 ; 6: 7 ; 21: 23 ; 22: 19 ; 32: 23$ | ultimately (4) |
| 18:7,12;70:22 | 38:3;40:1;44:2 | 49:11;56:21;57:24;58:19 | 26:7;39:23;65:12;67:20 |
| suggestions (1) | template (1) | together (2) | ums (1) |


| 4:7 | unwieldy (1) | 18:19 | 39:12 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| unable (1) | 70:14 | verify (1) | weeks (1) |
| 38:12 | unwilling (1) | 52:25 | 70:18 |
| uncertain (1) | 59:23 | versus (1) | weight (1) |
| 44:13 | up (24) | 10:1 | 5:9 |
| uncomitted (1) | 7:18;9:9;17:4;22:10,18,24; | vested (1) | wellbore (2) |
| 50:2 | 24:6;26:19;30:7,12;36:7;58:19, | 50:10 | 25:6,19 |
| uncommitted (20) | 21,25;61:14;63:3,5,25;64:7,13, | via (2) | wells (7) |
| 6:19;7:4,12;16:4;18:1,4,8; | 15,22,25;66:2 | 5:24;22:20 | 47:21;57:22;59:16;63:2,2,9, |
| 19:11;25:6,8,14,23;26:15;27:7; | upcoming (2) | viability (1) | 13 |
| 35:22;36:15;50:20;56:20;65:6; | 45:16;49:21 | 19:3 | well-versed (1) |
| 71:4 | upon (8) | view (2) | 31:5 |
| unconstitutional (1) | 28:20;52:3,9;53:17,24;54:3; | 33:19,20 | West (2) |
| 36:17 | 66:10;71:4 | violate (1) | 4:21;47:13 |
| undefined (1) | upper (1) | 35:3 | western (2) |
| 35:10 | 57:10 | violated (1) | 47:12;55:10 |
| under (16) | urging (1) | 20:21 | whatnot (1) |
| 9:13;16:22;17:13,23;25:20, | 69:15 | violating (2) | 46:16 |
| 25;38:7;42:9,25;45:3;53:22; | use (10) | 17:21;43:8 | what's (11) |
| 54:16;66:12;68:11;70:12;71:13 | 6:25;15:23;23:16;24:25; | violation (1) | 24:24;25:1;26:11;28:6,7,9, |
| understood (1) | 25:5,21;32:18;45:19;51:1; | 37:18 | 11,16;29:9;60:3,10 |
| 56:5 | 68:16 | virtual (1) | wherein (1) |
| undertaken (1) | used (17) | 5:13 | 19:8 |
| 11:13 | 6:6,12;11:6;22:1,6;23:20; | virtually (5) | whole (2) |
| unfortunately (1) | 24:11,13,19,21;25:4;43:19; | 16:15;19:14;23:9;56:13; | 63:8;65:19 |
| 35:11 | 47:1;54:21;55:25;56:1;60:8 | 71:11 | willing (1) |
| unhappy (1) | useful (3) | visit (1) | 64:14 |
| 32:15 | 15:17;31:9;54:13 | 5:24 | window (1) |
| uniformity (2) | uses (2) | vital (1) | 61:12 |
| 13:1;17:3 | 51:15,18 | 13:13 | Winmill (5) |
| unimportant (1) | using (1) | voluntary (4) | 11:21;37:16;66:22;67:15; |
| 43:10 | 32:14 | 28:8;35:24;47:7;52:4 | 68:1 |
| Unintelligible (1) | utilities' (1) | vs (8) | Winmill's (3) |
| 59:5 | 20:21 | $9: 14 ; 14: 1 ; 19: 8 ; 20: 8 ; 37: 7$ | 9:25;19:8;21:8 |
| unique (1) | utility (1) | $38: 2,5 ; 65: 11$ | wish (1) |
| $31: 10$ | 20:17 utilization (1) |  | 36:11 |
| unit (24) | utilization (1) | W | within (8) |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 4:18;6:20;7:12;17:5;18:8,10, } \\ & \text { 11;19:25;28:21,24;29:22;30:3; } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 12:23 } \\ \text { utilizing (1) } \end{gathered}$ | walk (2) | $\begin{aligned} & 7: 12 ; 13: 10 ; 16: 20 ; 21: 12 \\ & \text { 29:22;45:20;68:19;71:14 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 45:25;46:2,6;50:21;51:9;52:4, | 52:10 | 30:12;45:10 | without (4) |
| 10;53:1;54:7;56:20;61:2,5 |  | wants (3) | 13:17;43:24;52:5;63:10 |
| United (3) | V | 27:11;70:3,5 | Witnesses (1) |
| 31:19;39:4;60:14 |  | Washington (1) | 7:7 |
| units (3) | valid (4) | 64:3 | words (5) |
| 17:2;28:10;52:4 | 37:6;38:22;39:9;65:18 | waste (9) | 9:22;10:11,22;15:20;60:17 |
| universe (3) | validly (1) | 12:14,25;13:17,19;14:14,18, | work (4) |
| 57:1;66:20;70:15 | 39:9 | 24;26:14;68:23 | 37:25;49:1;60:18;63:20 |
| unknown (1) | valley (1) | watch (1) | working (7) |
| 56:17 | 23:21 | 6:1 | 15:24;17:16;24:15,22;64:2,3, |
| unless (1) | value (11) | watching (1) | 3 |
| 63:25 | 43:4;52:16,20,25;53:3,6,9; | 5:23 | workovers (1) |
| un-mute (4) | 55:3;69:4,12,15 | waters (1) | 63:3 |
| 57:14,18;58:7,9 | vary (1) | 4:23 | works (1) |
| unnecessary (1) | 47:3 | way (11) | 55:13 |
| 10:18 | varying (1) | 33:19,21;37:4,9;41:18,20,23; | worse (1) |
| unquote (1) | 17:5 | 44:14;47:8;59:13;61:22 | 45:11 |
| 9:21 | vast (4) | ways (3) | written (4) |
| unreasonable (1) | 26:10,25;41:8;47:16 | 17:12,12;70:7 | 5:9;47:8,8;71:13 |
| 29:5 | VEGA (6) | webinar (1) | wrong (3) |
| unrelated (1) | 49:9,10;54:19,25;56:8,10 | 57:6 | 19:21;43:17;69:6 |
| 26:9 | Vega's (1) | website (4) | wrote (1) |
| unstated (2) | 69:1 | 5:25;6:3;21:24;27:16 | 34:15 |
| 34:17;35:15 | venue (1) | wee (1) | Wyoming (3) |

In the Matter of the Application of Snake River Oil and Gas to Integrate the Spacing Unit


